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THE PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD:
AN EXPERIMENT IN 1MUNICIPAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW *
STANFORD SHMTKLER f
The home rule charter adopted by the citizens of Philadelphia on
April 17, 1951, created the framework for an agency which seems to be
unique in modern municipal government-the Tax Review Board.'
Subsequent municipal legislation defined the Board's powers and
duties,2 and, since the beginning of its operations, it has become a
significant governmental instrument, aiding both city and taxpayer in
their attempts to make sense out of the confusing and growing mass
of municipal revenue-raising measures.
The proliferation of taxes and municipal charges-a proliferation
produced by legislative attempts to meet ever-increasing costs-has
embroiled municipal governments in more and more disputes with
their citizen-taxpayers. Prior to the creation of the Tax Review
Board, there was, in Philadelphia, no way to review or settle these
* This Article is the result of a field study made possible by a grant from the
Thomas Skelton Harrison Foundation and conducted under the auspices of the Institute
of Legal Research of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author served
as director of the project and was assisted by a number of Philadelphia attorneys and
students of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, who conducted legal research
and interviewed members and staff and examined the files of the Tax Review Board,
the department of collections, city council, the Archives of Philadelphia, and other
governmental agencies. The author is particularly grateful for the assistance rendered
by Bernard L. Segal, Esq., and Barry R. Speigel, Esq., in this respect.
Particular aclowledgment must be made to Professor Paul W. Bruton, of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, the first chairman of the Tax Review Board,
and to Hon. David Berger, presently city solicitor of Philadelphia and a former
chairman of the Board, both of whom helped formulate the nature of this study
and gave valuable suggestions and criticisms, in addition to making available all of
the files of their agencies and the cooperation of their staffs. Lennox L. Moak, the
first director of finance of the city under the home rule charter and presently director
of the Bureau of Municipal Research-Pennsylvania Economy League (Eastern Divi-
sion), kindly consented to serve as consultant, and his comments and suggestions
have proved valuable. Emanuel S. Wolfson, executive secretary of the Tax Review
Board, has cooperated fully in providing information, statistics, and valuable sug-
gestions. Revenue Commissioner Mortin E. Rotman and his deputy, Romanus
Buckley, provided the full cooperation of their department. A number of attorneys
who have frequently appeared before the Board read drafts of this report and gave
helpful suggestions. Finally, but by no means least, the author is grateful to Pro-
fessor James C. N. Paul, director of the Institute of Legal Research, for his helpful
suggestions and guidance during this study.
t Research Associate, Institute of Legal Research, University of Pennsylvania.
B.S. 1951, LL.B. 1954, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Pennsylvania and
District of Columbia Bars.
' See PHmADELPHIA HOME ROLE CHARTER §§ 3-100(f), -914, 6-207.
2 Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board Ordinance, Sept 9, 1953, 1953 PaiLA-
DELPHIA ORDINANCEs 478-84, as amended. See note 9 infra.
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disputes at the administrative tax-collection level. The city provided
no machinery, no established procedures, no impartial knowledgeable
persons for reviewing a bona fide claim. Indeed, allegations of unfair
treatment and skulduggery were not lacking. The law had not been
consistently developed through administrative decision-making. The
business of tax collection was held in low repute in many respects.
Ironically, the law also dealt harshly with the taxpayer who in
good faith sought court review of a questionable exaction imposed by
his municipality. Formal litigation in court, the taxpayer's only rem-
edy, was an unsatisfactory method of settling valid disputes. Ana-
chronistic statutes and court decisions declared that the way to frame
a reviewable case was for the taxpayer to refuse to pay all charges
which he believed were improperly imposed; he would then be sued
by the city.' If he lost, he was obliged to pay interest and penalty
exactions even if the claim had merit and had been asserted in good
faith.4 Moreover, in a jurisdiction like Philadelphia, with heavy court
backlogs and long delays, these extra charges were often augmented
through no fault of the taxpayer. These disadvantages, added to the
high cost in legal fees of fighting a case in court, explain why many
taxpayers were deterred from contesting questioned tax bills and why
the procedures for review were inequitable. A better system was
needed to improve tax collection methods, to review contested cases,
and to raise taxpayer morale.
The reform movement which gained control of Philadelphia gov-
ernment in the early 1950's reviewed many fields of municipal govern-
ment, and among the initial remedies provided for the city's collection
evils was a mandate in the new city charter that there be created a
"Tax Review Board." 5 The Board's precise role and duties were to
be spelled out by the city council.6 Two years later council imple-
mented the charter provision by creating a five-man Board,' whose
3 Freedman, Some Personal Reflections on the Establishnent of the Philadelphia
Tax Review Board, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 663, 666 (1961). See also RHYNE, MuNicinAL
LAW 710 (1957).
4 Freedman, supra note 3, at 666-67.
5 PHI.ADELPHIA HoME RULE CHARTER §§ 3-100(f), -914, 6-207. A special edition
published by the Charter Commission "as an aid to the officials and employees of the
City who are charged with carrying out its provisions," Preface at xxi, contained
annotations, including "sources" and "purposes" of each section, prepared by the
legislative draftsman under the direction of the drafting committee as authorized by
resolution of the Charter Commission. All references in this study to the charter
are to this annotated edition.
6 PHILADELPHIA HomE RULE CHARTER § 6-207 provides: "The Tax Review
Board shall perform such duties as the Council shall from time to time impose
upon it." I I I I !
7 Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board Ordinance, Sept. 9, 1953, 1953 PHrLA-
DELPHA ORDINANcES 478-84, provided that the Tax Review Board should be com-
posed of five members appointed by the mayor, at least one of whom shall be an
accountant and one a lawyer. The charter had provided for a three-man Board,
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members were to be appointed by the mayor and whose task it was to
review decisions of the city's administrative officials affecting the
liability of citizens for all municipal taxes and charges except property
valuation.'
The charter provision and the Board's organic legislation 9 are
defective in certain fundamental respects. Perhaps the most basic
defect is their failure to speak clearly on the Board's status: they fail
to state whether the Board is to be simply an investigatory fact-finding
executive agency to aid the city in tax administration, or, alternatively,
whether it is to assume an independent adjudicatory function com-
parable to that of a municipal tax court, with power to bind the city
by its decisions unless those decisions are set aside by a court.
Despite such ambiguities in its status, the Tax Review Board, in
its first years of operation, has in fact assumed adjudicatory powers,
has decided a vast volume of disputes between city and citizen, and
has helped to foster uniformity in interpretation of the city's revenue
laws and fair and efficient settlement of disputes coming before it.
The Board has proved to be an appropriate forum for all classes of
taxpayers, especially those at opposite ends of the spectrum of dis-
puted cases-those who have claims too small to justify the time and
expense exacted by litigation in the courts, and those whose claims pose
complicated factual problems requiring long and careful attention and
expert evaluation, expensive claims which would be difficult to litigate
composed of the director of finance, the city treasurer, and the city solicitor, with
the right being left to council to increase the membership to five. PHILADELPHIA
HOME RULE CHARTER § 3-914. The Board as initially constituted never met, never
promulgated rules of procedure, never heard any petitions, and never took any action.
The annotations to that section of the charter indicate that the draftsmen did not
expect the Board to have a great volume of cases to review until council should define
the scope of matters to be appealed to it, at which time the Board would be increased
to five members. The annotation states: "At that time an accountant and a lawyer
will be required to be members of the Board because the Board will be concerned
with review of tax cases and any one of the three members originally constituting
the Board may be replaced."
8 The original tax review board ordinance, Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board
Ordinance § 4, Sept. 9, 1953, 1953 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 479-80, imposed on
the Board the duty of hearing and determining petitions for review of any decision
of an administrative officer of the city fixing amounts payable, as well as determining
appeals from and reviewing decisions of the revenue commissioner. This jurisdictional
grant was modified in the 1956 codification of the tax review board ordinance, and
the code now provides for the review of decisions relating to the liability of any
person for unpaid money or claim collectible by the department of collections. PHILA-
DELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1702 (1956). This does not
include questions relating to property valuation.
9 The original tax review board ordinance was amended in 1955 by Philadelphia,
Pa., Ordinance of Dec. 27, 1955, 1955 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 1142. In 1956 all
laws of general application, including those relating to the Tax Review Board, were
codified and revised. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES (1956).
Since the code was adopted, the sections dealing with the Board, chapter 19, have
been amended twice. Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance of June 5, 1956, 1956 PHILADELPHIA
ORDINANCES 278; Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance of Feb. 27, 1957, 1957 PHILADELPHIA
ORDINANCES 120.
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before harried judges who are relatively unfamiliar with the intricacies
of municipal tax laws. The Board's decisions are infrequently ap-
pealed to the courts and they are usually upheld when appealed. The
agency has thus become an important source of municipal tax law. It
may well suggest itself as a model for other municipalities. Yet, be-
cause of the ambiguity in the organic law creating the Board, there
are many unresolved problems concerning its procedures and juris-
diction-indeed, its long-term role in Philadelphia's government.
THE BOARD's CURRENT OPERATIONS
Taxes and Other Charges
Philadelphia now has an operating budget of $281,666,698.10
It raises revenue to meet this expenditure through a multiplicity of
taxes, rents, and other charges imposed on many diverse activities.
Taxes imposed by the state for the benefit of the city include those
on real estate ' and those on intangible personal property.' 2  A state
10 Ordinance for Adopting the Operating Budget of 1961, Philadelphia, Pa.,
Nov. 30, 1960.
11 The state legislature, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 17031 (1957), authorized the
city of Philadelphia to levy a tax for municipal purposes on all subjects of taxation
specified in § 32 of the Act of April 29, 1844, Pa. Laws 1844, act 318, at 497, and to
provide by ordinances a system for the assessment and collection of the authorized
taxes. The 1844 act authorizing, inter alia, taxes on real property, was subsequently
repealed in part, but its subject is presently covered by the General County Assess-
ment Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020.201 (Supp. 1960), which subjects real
estate to taxation for city and county purposes. Pursuant to this statutory authority,
annual municipal ordinances have been passed by Philadelphia's city council dealing
with this subject See, e.g., Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance of Nov. 30, 1953, 1953
PHLADELPHIA ORDINANCES 643-44, setting the rates of taxation for such property
in accordance with authorization granted by the legislature in 1854, PA. STAT. A-N.
tit. 53, § 17034 (1957). If city council should neglect to act in any year, it is pro-
vided by statute that the rate shall remain the same as that imposed for the previous
year. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 17035 (1957). Assessment in Philadelphia is the
function of the Board of Revision of Taxes. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5341.1-.21
(Supp. 1960). This Board was transformed from its original status as a county
office into one of the city by the 1951 City-County Consolidation Amendment to the
Pennsylvania constitution, PA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 8, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953). The
collection of this tax is a task of the city's department of collections.
The anomalous status of the Board of Revision of Taxes derives primarily from
the First Class City Home Rule Act of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13101-57
(1957), which precludes cities of the first class--of which Philadelphia is the only
one-from exercising any powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of,
powers granted by acts of the general assembly which are applicable to that class
of cities on the subjects of limiting rates and fixing proper subjects of taxation, or
which provide for the assessment of real or personal property for taxation purposes.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53, § 13133 (1957). Thus, the state has authorized the city to
levy a tax on real property and to impose any rate of taxation-or none--on such
property; however, the city cannot modify the subject of taxation or even the assess-
ment procedure.
1
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 4821 (Supp. 1960). In this act, the state legislature
has imposed a tax on certain classes of intangible personal property held by Phila-
delphia residents. This tax is imposed for the benefit of the county (or city, under
the consolidation amendment), and its assessment is a function of the Board of
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enabling law"3 has been used by the city council to impose a city
income tax (consisting of levies on wages and net profits),14 an
annual mercantile license tax,15 an entertainment tax,18 a realty
transfer tax, 17 a public parking lot tax,'8 and a mechanical amusement
device tax. 9 In addition to these business taxes, the city council has
imposed charges for licenses and permits for the "privilege" of con-
ducting various activities-for example, auctioneering 2  and operating
Revision of Taxes. The collection of this tax is a function of the city's department
of collections. The legislature likewise imposes a tax on almost the identical classes
of intangible personal property for purposes of the school district of Philadelphia.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 581.1-.16a (1950), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24,
§§ 581.1-.16a (Supp. 1960). The Board of Revision performs the assessment function
and the department of collections the collection task on behalf of the school district.
See note 126 infra and accompanying text. Discounts for early payment and interest
and penalties for late payments are specified. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL
ORDINANCES § 19-1101 (1956). See Note, Administration of the Intangible Personal
Property Tax in Philadelphia, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 391 (1954).
13 In 1932 the state legislature authorized cities of the first class to enact ordi-
nances imposing taxes on persons, transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects, and
personal property within the city limits, except such as are, or may become, subject
to a state tax or license fee. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 15971 (1957). This act has
been designated as the "Sterling Act." Fifteen years later a more general enabling
act gave similar powers to other communities and has been termed the "Tax Anything"
Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 6851 (1957), as amended.
14PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1500 (1956) imposes
a wage and net profits tax, generically referred to as the city income tax. This is
an annual imposition of 1.625% on income earned from wages, salaries, and like forms
of compensation earned in Philadelphia or by Philadelphia residents wherever earned,
and on net profits of businesses derived from Philadelphia or earned by Philadelphia
firms. See 2 JOURNAL OF THE (PHILADELPHIA.) CITY COUNCIL 1051, 1687-88 (1960).
Interest, penalties, and costs for late payment of all taxes imposed under title 19 of
the code, other than real estate and personal property taxes, are specified. PHiLA-
DELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-508 (1956).
15 The mercantile license tax is composed of a $3.00 annual license fee for each
place of doing business in Philadelphia plus an annual imposition presently in the
sum of three mills on each dollar of gross business attributable to all persons engaged
in any trade, business, profession, vocation or in any manufacturing, commercial,
service, or utility business or activity in Philadelphia. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE
OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1000 (1956).
16 The city requires a license for the producing of any form of entertainment
in the sum of $10.00 for each permanent place of amusement or a fee of $1.00 per
day for each temporary place of amusement, and imposes a tax upon the admission
fee or privilege to attend or engage in any amusement. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE
OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-600 (1956).
17The city also imposes a levy on the making, executing, issuing, or delivering
of any document transferring title to real estate amounting to 1% of the value of
the property represented by such document, payment of which must be evidenced
by the affixing of a stamp to every such document. This is known as the realty
transfer tax. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENFRAL ORDINANCES § 19-1400 (1956).
18The public parking lot tax amounts to 10% of the gross receipts of lots in
Philadelphia. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1200 (1956).
This tax is imposed in addition to the annual license fee of $10.00 imposed by the
city. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 9-601(5) (1956).
19The mechanical amusement device tax requires annual registration of every
coin-operated mechanical device used for amusement or entertainment and payment
of an annual tax of $25.00 for each such device. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL
ORDINANCES § 19-900 (1956).
20 An annual license tax of $500.00 is imposed on every person engaged in that
business. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-700 (1956).
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bowling alleys.2 1 The city also imposes charges for the use of its
water and sewer facilities.22  And municipal institutions such as hos-
pitals and homes for the indigent impose charges for their services.3
The valuation and assessment of the state-imposed real estate and
personal property taxes ' fall within the jurisdiction of the Board of
Revision of Taxes-a vestige of county government lingering from the
era when city and county were governed separately, and still more or
less independent from the city. Initial property valuations are made
by assessors employed by that agency, and disputes are reviewed by
the Board of Revision, with appeal to the courts available.25  However,
collection of these taxes in the amount certified as due is a task of the
department of collections-a large city executive agency which collects
all revenues which may be due the municipality.26 Appeals from the
decisions of the department affecting collection of these property taxes,
including interest and penalties imposed for nonpayment of any portion
due, fall within the jurisdiction of the Tax Review Board.2 1 But on
appeals concerning personal property and real estate taxes, the Board
has limited itself to the question of method or procedure of billing and
enforcement of collections, or to the validity of the interest and penalties
imposed for late payment or nonpayment; the Board has refused to
2 1 An annual tax of $25.00 per alley is imposed on the operation of such a
business. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-800 (1956).
Similarly, the code in titles dealing with the regulation of various activities-such
as the air pollution code, the building code, the fire code, the health code, the housing
code, and those dealing with streets, zoning, and planning, and the regulation of
businesses, trades, professions, and individual conduct and activities-enumerates
numerous other activities for which licenses or permits are required, such as con-
ducting barber and beauty shops, blasting, curb markets, junk yards, waste collecting,
and so on.
22 These are annual charges based on actual usage of water at a rate determined
by the water department under standards established by the city council pursuant
to the charter. PHILADELPHIA HOmE RULE CHARm § 5-801; PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
CODE oF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 13-201 (1956). These are not taxes imposed under
the authority of the enabling legislation, see note 13 supra, but rather are charges
for services rendered by the city. Interest and penalties for late payment are provided.
PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1606 (1956).
23 For a discussion of the nature of these charges, of the applicability to them of
the statute of limitations, and of the applicability to them of the refund and compro-
mise sections of the 1953 tax review board ordinance, see 1954 Ops. (PHILADELPHIA)
C=l SoLIclT0R 151 (Formal Opinion No. 140); 1954 Ops. (PHILADELPHIA) CITY
SOLIcIToR 43 (Formal Opinion No. 113).
2 4 Including taxes imposed upon these classes of property for the benefit of the
school district See notes 123-25 infra and accompanying text.
25 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5341.1-.21 (Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit 72, § 4821 (Supp. 1960).
2 6 PHLADELPHIA HOME Rulr CHARTER § 6-206. The department of collections
also acts as collection agent for taxes imposed for benefit of the school district and
is authorized to file joint tax claims on behalf of the city and school district. PHILA-
DELHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-506 (1956).
2 7 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1702 (1956).
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consider questions of assessment and valuation.28  In fact, the 1953
tax review board ordinance specified that the Board should have no
jurisdiction over matters within the jurisdiction of the Board of Re-
vision; 29 however, this provision was omitted from the 1956 codifica-
tion of Philadelphia's general ordinances."
The various business taxes imposed by the city-including the
wage tax-are self-assessed by the taxpayer or his employer. The
department of collections audits the returns, make assessments against
those who fail or refuse to file, and bills and collects these taxes, as
well as interest and penalties in appropriate cases. The department is
authorized to accept installment payments of delinquent taxes and
penalties."1 It is also empowered to enter compromises of tax and
other claims where such compromise is "in the best interest of the
City." 32 However, no criteria have been enunciated for determining
what compromises are in fact in the city's best interests.
Various other charges imposed by the city, ranging from water
and sewer bills to license fees, are initially imposed by many different
agencies; but responsibility for collecting these is also the job of the
2 8 Discounts are provided by the city for early payment of real estate taxes, and
penalties for late payment of such taxes. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL
ORDINANCES § 19-1302 (1956). These adjustments are authorized by state law. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5511.10 (1950). Likewise, discounts and penalties are provided
by the city with relation to the personal property taxes, PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE
OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1101 (1956), as authorized by the state, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, §4843.1(c) (1950). These penalties relate to collections; the personal
property tax act also imposes a penalty of 12% to be added to the estimated assess-
ment of taxable property where an individual fails to file a return or to include all
taxable property. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 4844 (1950). As to the Board's refusal
to consider questions of assessment and valuation, see note 115 infra.
29 Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board Ordinance § 4(b), Sept 9, 1953, 1953
PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 479.
30 See notes 112-19 infra and accompanying text.
31 However, if partial payments are made on account of any delinquent tax, such
payment must be prorated between the principal sum of the tax and the penalties
and interest accumulated on it. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES
§ 19-504 (1956). If the taxpayer specifies that a payment is to be applied to principal
only, the city must so apply it if the payment is accepted. Letter from Leonard B.
Rosenthal, Assistant City Solicitor, to Carlyle S. Robinson, Department of Collections,
April 17, 1956.
32 The original tax review board ordinance gave to the revenue commissioner
the power to consider petitions for the compromise of principal of any claim,
including interest and penalties thereon, and to grant such petitions upon determination
that the compromise was in the best financial interest of the city; his decision denying
the compromise was made final but a decision granting it was made subject to ap-
proval by the Tax Review Board. Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board Ordinance
§§ 5, 8, Sept. 9, 1953, 1953 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 479-80. The code is less
specific: it requires petitions for compromise of claims, including interest and penalties
thereon, to set forth the facts which the petitioner believes warrant a finding that
the compromise is in the best interest of the city; such petitions are to be considered
by the department of collections and, if granted, shall become final only after approval
by the Board. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1704 (1956).
Originally, the code gave the taxpayer the right to appeal to the Board any decision
by the department refusing to enter such a compromise, but this provision was repealed
later in 1956 at the request of the Board, which took the position that codification
should not result in revision-even though the specific revision was favored by the
Board. See notes 133-34 infra and accompanying text.
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department of collections. 3 Disputes over the amount claimed must
ordinarily go to that department.
4
As can be seen, the department of collections, taking in a yearly
revenue of approximately $200,000,000, is engaged in a major finan-
cial operation which brings the city into contact with several million
"icustomers." " The mere mention of the various taxes, charges, and
procedures for collection should highlight the fact that the department,
as the city's collection agent, is constantly confronted with questions
and disputes over the application of the revenue ordinances to various
transactions or, granting the applicability of the tax, over the amount
due. For example, under the wage and net profits taxes, the courts
have held that earned income is taxable but that passive income,
derived solely from investment, is exempt.3" The municipal tax
laws abound with many problems requiring adjudications of an
analogous nature.3 7 Or consider the plight of the taxpayer who fails
to file a return for the payment of a self-assessed tax. These taxes
3 3 For example, the department is required by the charter to collect all fees and
charges for issuance by the city of any licenses or permits, and assigns its employees
to duty in the department of licenses and inspections to receive such fees or charges.
See PHILADELPHIA HoME RULE CHARTER § 6-201 (d). This procedure applies to
those licenses imposed-under provisions other than title 19 of the code. The latter
are issued directly by the department of collections. See PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE
OF GENmAL ORDINANCES § 19-501 (1956).
34 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1702 (1956). This
is not true, however, as to refusal of the department of licenses, through its chief
of licenses division, to issue a license or permit under any section other than title 19
of the code. Such refusal may be appealed to the board of license and inspection
review, which is a departmental board of the department of licenses and inspections,
created by the charter. See PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE CHARm § 5-1005. Thus, no
question concerning the issuance of such licenses or permits falls within the jurisdiction
of the Tax Review Board. However, taxpayers seeking refunds for such moneys must
make claim on forms prepared by the department of collections, which are first sub-
mitted to the license division where they will be endorsed and forwarded to the
department of collections. They are then treated like any other refund petition, and
the department of collections' action becomes subject to Tax Review Board juris-
diction.
35 See PHILADELPHIA DEP'T OF COLLECTIONS ANN. REP. (1959).
36 See Murray v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 524, 70 A.2d 647 (1950) ; Breitinger v.
Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 512, 70 A.2d 640 (1950); Quald v. Tax Review Bd., 188 Pa.
Super. 623, 149 A.2d 557 (1959).
37Examples of such problems which the Board has faced or is facing are:
whether the mercantile license tax is applicable to lawyers and other classes, see Freed-
man, supra note 3, at 667 n.24; whether certain wholesalers and manufacturers are
entitled, under PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE Or GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1003 (1956),
to use the alternative method of tax computation provided in that section; and to
what extent must a citizen's activities be associated with Philadelphia to render
him liable for the payment of the mercantile license tax, PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE
OF GENERAL ORDINAN cES §§ 19-1001(5), (6), -1003 (1956), and the wage and net
profits tax, PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1502(1) (1956).
Likewise, broken water meters have often given rise to the problem of properly
estimating usage for the purposes of computing water and sewer rental charges;
in such situations, PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1604
(1956), authorizes the department of collections to compute the amount of water
used according to such method of computation as the water department by regulation
may prescribe.
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accrue whether or not returns or bills are sent to taxpayers,3 8 and
many have sought relief from the heavy interest and penalties exacted
for nonpayment. Similarly, taxpayers frequently seek relief from the
imposition of charges for municipal services-such as hospital bills
or rents for the use of water and sewer facilities-where the city has
failed to send bills for many years.
In addition to the problem of deciding, in a fair fashion, disputes
over liability for these taxes and charges, it has proved necessary for
the city to devise methods for awarding refunds and entering into com-
promises with its citizens. Not only may taxpayers now test their
liability under the taxing ordinances by paying the amount claimed
and then seeking a refund, but they may also seek refunds for a va-
riety of other reasons. Among these are double payment,3 9 payment
without liability,40 overpayments resulting from a change in the form
of a business or a termination of a business entity during a taxable
year,4 ' excess payments of water and sewer rents resulting from er-
roneous readings of meters or from defective meters, payments for
permits purchased but not actually used,42 or payments made to the
wrong city agency.
The total picture evidences the need for a municipal agency which
can resolve city-taxpayer disputes efficiently and fairly, with due regard
to the public interest. This is the task of the Tax Review Board.
Functions of the Board
The Philadelphia Code of General Ordinances provides that the
Board is to review, on petition of an aggrieved taxpayer, decisions of
the department of collections concerning liability for the taxes, rents,
licenses, and other charges which are the department's responsibility.
3
In fact this includes review of virtually all charges except questions
relating to the valuation of real estate and personal property assess-
ments. Any citizen may invoke the Board's jurisdiction, whether he
has already paid the amount claimed and seeks a refund or whether
38 The Personal Property Tax Act provides that no failure to assess or return
property shall discharge the owner of taxable property of his liability for the tax.
PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 72, § 4844 (1950). The registered or true owner of each tract
of taxable property is liable for the real estate tax on such property. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, §5020-407(c) (1950).
39 Resulting, for example, from withholding by the employer as well as payment
by the individual employee.
4oAs, for example, in the case of a nonresident working for a local firm but
actually employed outside the city.
41 As in the case of the mercantile license tax which is payable in advance.
42 Because, for example, of the cancellation of the job for which the permit was
originally required.
43 PHnADELPHiA, PA., CoDE oF GENERAL ORnNANCES § 19-1702 (1956).
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he disputes, before payment, the amount claimed. Simple forms for
filing the appropriate petitions 44 are supplied by the Board, and there
are no fees. Within a period of a few months, the Board-which
meets at least twice a week-will hear the dispute.45 The hearing is
an adversary-type proceeding-with the city, represented by one of
its lawyers, 46 arrayed against the taxpayer with or without counsel,
4
1
44At the present time the Board, acting under the power granted by the PHUA-
DELPHIA HOME RULE CHicTER §§ 8-406, -407, and the PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF
GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1701(2) (1956), has promulgated regulations providing
for five types of petitions; three of these originate with the taxpayer; two of them
reach the Board from the department of collections. Taxpayers wishing to obtain
a review of a department decision concerning their liability for any sum claimed file
a "petition for review" in duplicate with the Board. Tax Rev. Bd. Regs. art. 4,
Feb. 5, 1954. These petitions must be filed within sixty days after the mailing of
the notice of the amount claimed by the department. Taxpayers dissatisfied with the
department's refusal of a refund may file a "refund appeal' petition in duplicate
within ninety days after the mailing of the department's denial of the refund. PHiLA-
DELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1703 (1956) ; Tax Rev. Bd. Regs.
art. 5, Feb. 5, 1954. If the taxpayer does not deny liability for the amount claimed
but merely seeks relief from interest or penalties or both, he may file in duplicate
a petition for "waiver of interest and/or penalty." No specific authority for such
petitions appears in the code. See also notes 133-48 infra and accompanying text.
The Board forwards one copy of the petition to the revenue commissioner who heads
the department of collections. Tax Rev. Bd. Regs. arts. 4, 5, Feb. 5, 1954. A second
copy is forwarded to the law department, although the regulations do not specifically
so require. No answer need be filed unless so ordered by the Board. Tax Rev. Bd.
Regs. art. 8, Feb. 5, 1954.
If the department decides to grant a taxpayer's request for refund after the
taxpayer has filed a petition with the department's refund section, it notes its approval
on the petition and forwards it to the Board for approval. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE
OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1703 (1956); Tax Rev. Bd. Regs. art. 6, Feb. 5,
1954. Such approval is not necessary if the refund is granted because of overpayment
resulting from duplication of payments or mathematical error in computation or
other mechanical mistake such as typographical error. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE
OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1703(5) (1956). If a taxpayer seeks to compromise
his liability, he must prepare a petition for presentation to the department. If
approved, the department will originate a request for compromise approval to be
presented to the Board. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1704
(1956) ; Tax Rev. Bd. Regs. art. 7, Feb. 5, 1954.
45 The code requires that all matters coming before the Board shall be listed
and heard within ninety days of filing. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDI-
NANCES § 19-1701(3) (a) (1956). It also provides that the Board shall consider each
petition for review within a reasonable time. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL
ORDINANCES § 19-1702(3) (1956), as amended, Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance of
June 5, 1956, 1956 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 278. While no sanction is provided
for failure to meet either of these requirements, there has been no appreciable docket
delay in disposing of petitions. Uncontested petitions, such as those for refund and
compromise approvals, excepting those which the Board decides initially to disapprove
or modify, are generally acted upon within a few weeks. Contested petitions are
generally scheduled for hearing within a few months, and decisions are generally
rendered within a few days of hearing.
46The Board's regulations provide that the city may be represented by the
revenue commissioner or other administrative officer or his duly authorized subordi-
nate, or the city solicitor or any attorney-at-law duly designated by him. Tax Rev.
Bd. Regs. art. 2(b), Feb. 5, 1954. As a matter of practice the city is usually repre-
sented by an assistant city solicitor regularly assigned to such hearings, and the
department of collections may send a representative if factual testimony is needed.
47 The Board's regulations provide that a taxpayer may be represented by himself
or, in the case of an association, by an authorized officer, or by any other person duly
authorized by the taxpayer. Frequently an attorney or accountant appears as the
taxpayer's advocate.
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and the Board sitting as an impartial forum. Basic rules of evidence
are accorded due respect; a written transcript is taken; 18 an air of
judicial formality obtains. In any case deemed important or difficult,
the decision is explained by a "formal" opinion 4 9 which will be dis-
tributed not only to the parties but to other interested groups, legal
periodicals, and reporting services.
During its first five years of operation, the Tax Review Board
has disposed of a large quantity of taxpayer-city disputes which might
otherwise have clogged court dockets or in which the taxpayers would
have had no adequate remedy at all. Thus the most important func-
tion of the Board, both as to volume of cases and basic purpose, is its
dispute-settling job-adjudicating disputed tax cases and interpreting
tax law.
The Board's second function is to review refunds granted by the
department and compromises negotiated between the department and
taxpayers. Refunds and compromises become final only after they
have been approved or modified by the Board. This "watchdog"
task, essentially one of auditing, is designed-and seems desirable-
to prevent abuses of a kind once thought to exist in the city.
The Board's third role-different from the adjudicatory and
"watchdog" functions-is to serve as an instrument for providing
equitable relief from interest and penalty exactions in cases where
liability exists but where added charges against the taxpayer are, for
some reason or another, deemed unjust.5
At its inception the Board was presented with many important
substantive issues of interpretation of new tax measures, including a
huge backlog of disputes which had been held. for settlement pending
implementation of the charter provisions creating the Board. Thus
the Board adjudicated a number of fundamental questions of tax ordi-
nance construction during its first years of existence. More recently,
as might be expected, the tax liability issues raised before the Board
4 8 As an economy move, the Board for several months dispensed with stenographic
transcripts in hearings on petitions for waiver of interest or penalties.
49 Where a case is considered to be governed by a prior decision of the Board
or where the issue is not complex, the Board may simply render a written decision
or an "informal" opinion which, after discussing the facts, merely refers to the
governing precedent without setting out in detail the legal analysis. These opinions
are sent to the taxpayer and appropriate city officials. Tax Rev. Bd. Regs. art. 12,
Feb. 5, 1954. All decisions are rendered in executive session. Three members of
the Board are necessary to constitute a quorum and to render decisions. PHiLADEL-
PHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1701 (1) (d) (1956), as amended,
Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance of June 5, 1956, 1956 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 278.
50 PHI.ADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES §§ 19-1703, -1704 (1956).
51 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1705 (1956). As to
whether authority exists for the granting of such relief where liability for the prin-
dpal charge is not denied, see notes 137-52 infra and accompanying text.
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have become more and more factual.52 But when the department of
collections decides, as it does periodically, to implement some new
policy, 3 or when the city solicitor promulgates an opinion dealing with
taxes or collection procedures, 4 or when a court passes on a previously
unresolved tax issue,5 a new flood of petitions on basic substantive
issues may be expected.
In its first seven years the Board handed down 137 formal opin-
ions. Many of these decisions dealt with problems of allocation under
the mercantile license and income taxes " under which the Board is
called upon to segregate business done within the city from business
done elsewhere. Allocation involves not only factual determinations,
but also legal conclusions-for example, whether services performed in
the city for clients outside the city are taxable 5 7 and whether receipts
from a foreign business can be attributable to its local office.58
Another group of decisions developed a pattern of precedent in
the complex area of whether a given business activity falls within the
terms of a given tax.r9 A third major group of opinions has devel-
oped distinctions between "earned" and "passive" income, particu-
52 In its annual report for 1958, the Board noted that the number of formal opin-
ions had declined "due to the fact that many questions regarding interpretation of
the tax ordinance have already been clarified by prior rulings of the Board." 1958
TAx REv. BD. ANN. REP. 2.
5 3 For example, initiating a policy of enforcement of the wage tax against
residents employed on federal property.
54 For example, a sudden influx of petitions dealing with personal property taxes
occurred after the city solicitor rendered two opinions concerning procedure for
obtaining refunds of personal property taxes where the Board of Revision of Taxes
desires to "correct' assessments. 1956 Ops. (PHILADELPHIA) CITY SOLICITOR 126, 162
(Informal Op. Nos. 253, 253a).
55 As, for example, occurred after the decision relating to the mercantile license
tax. Freedman, supra note 3, at 667. Less frequently, new petitions result from
action by the city council. This phenomenon is demonstrated by the large number
of refund approval petitions in 1955 resulting from an ordinance authorizing refunds
for some excess water and sewer charges during certain years prior to 1955. Phila-
delphia, Pa., Ordinance of Oct 12, 1955, 1955 PHILADELPrHIrA ORDINANCES 770, as
amended, *Ordinance of June 29, 1957, 1957 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANcES 505.
50 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GEnnA ORDINANCES §§ 19-1000, -1500 (1956).
57 See, e.g., Wilber E. Gehman, Docket No. 35.02-F889, Formal Op. No. 60-15,
Nov. 28, 1960; Frommeyer & Co., Docket Nos. 35.04-G134, -G135, Formal Op. No.
60-6, Sept. 14, 1960; Manheim Laundry Co., Docket No. 40.02-A462, Formal Op.
No. 57-9, March 7, 1957; Albright & Friel, Inc., Docket No. 40.02-545, Formal
Op. No. 56-2, March 2, 1956. Cf. Harold E. Stassen, Docket No. 30.02-G722, Formal
Op. No. 60-2, July 14, 1960 (whether taxpayer was domiciled in Philadelphia within
meaning of income tax).
58 See, e.g., Forrest Laundry, Docket No. 40.02-B554, Formal Op. No. 59-5,
Feb. 10, 1959; Norton, Lilly & Co., Docket Nos. 30.02-A976, 40.02-A735, Formal
Op. No. 57-25, Oct- 4, 1957; M. J. Kelly Co., Docket No. 40.02-A381, Formal Op.
No. 57-4, Feb. 28, 1957.
59 E.g., Marian Bank, Docket Nos. 30.05-G404, 35.05-G137, Formal Op. No. 60-7,
Sept. 14, 1960; Nestle Co., Docket No. 40.04-B444, Formal Op. No. 59-4, Jan. 12,
1959; Penn Galvanizing Co., Docket Nos. 40.02-A498, -A501, Formal Op. No.
57-14, April 26, 1957; Slater System, Inc., Docket Nos. 40.02-A813, -A814, Formal
Op. No. 56-16, July 25, 1956, Formal Op. No. 56-6, March 16, 1956.
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larly with regard to income derived from real estate, stocks, and the
sale of an interest in a business."° The state's appellate courts have
declared that "passive income" from investment in real estate and
stocks, and gain from the sale of "goodwill," are not taxable under
Philadelphia's income tax ordinances; 61 but the courts' rulings sug-
gest that the income is "earned," and therefore taxable, if there has
been some "business activity" connected with its production. For
example, the superior court pointed out that profits from real estate,
mortgages, and securities are not "earned" within the meaning of the
ordinance unless the taxpayer is engaged in the real estate, mortgage,
or security business.62 The Board's contribution has been to develop,
case by case, more specific criteria to implement these generalizations. 3
A final major category of formal decisional activity has developed a
body of law governing the collection of interest and penalties in cases
where, although liability for the tax assessment is admitted, the impo-
sition of these additional charges is challenged."
The vast majority of the Board's decisions are never appealed to
the courts. As of December 31, 1958, only seventy-six cases out of
the more than 10,000 petitions docketed, disposed of, and therefore
ripe for appeal,65 had been appealed to the courts of common pleas, and
of this number only a small percentage ever reached the superior or
supreme courts. 6 In all the appealed cases, the decisions of the Board
seem to have been treated favorably both by the trial and appellate
60 E.g., Dr. Arthur Steinberg, Docket No. 30.02-6, Formal Op. No. 57-21, July
12, 1957, supplementing Formal Op. No. 55-21, Sept. 15, 1955 (involving income
from royalties); Carl Metz, Docket Nos. 30.02-468, -519, Formal Op. No. 56-11,
June 1, 1956; Thomas T. Patterson, Docket Nos. 30.02-218, 40.02-257, Formal Op.
No. 55-5, April 5, 1955.
61 Murray v. Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 524, 70 A.2d 647 (1950) ; Breitinger v. Phila-
delphia, 363 Pa. 512, 70 A.2d 640 (1950) ; Quaid v. Tax Review Bd., 188 Pa. Super.
623, 149 A.2d 557 (1959).
62 Quaid v. Tax Review Bd., 188 Pa. Super. 623, 628, 149 A.2d 557, 559 (1959).
To be taxable the gain must be earned from the operation of a business and not
merely derived from the sale of an interest in that business. Id. at 629, 149 A.2d
at 560.
63 See Congoleum Nairn, Inc., Docket No. 40.02-D256, Formal Op. No. 60-5,
Aug. 11, 1960; cases cited note 60 supra.
64 E.g., Harry C. Dalton, Docket No. 30.05-C694, Formal Op. No. 59-3, Jan. 7,
1959. Cf. Edward E. Kelly, Docket No. 40.04-B416, Formal Op. No. 58-8, Oct. 21,
1958.
65 See 1958 TAx RFvEiw BOARD ANN. REPS. 3. The fact that there have been
so few appeals may reflect taxpayers' satisfaction with the results and fairness of the
decisions. A possible alternative--or concurrent--explanation is that the small amount
involved in most cases makes the cost of appeal prohibitive. Of course, if the cost
were prohibitive or the amount involved small, or both, there would be no practicable
appeal even in the absence of a Tax Review Board.
66 Since Bell Appeal, 396 Pa. 592, 152 A.2d 731 (1959), all appeals from com-
mon pleas review of Tax Review Board decisions are taken directly to the supreme
court.
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courts. A vast majority of its decisions have been affirmed,67 and fre-
quently the courts have approved the Board's reasoning without fur-
ther opinion.6" Similarly, decisions have often pointed out that great
deference is to be accorded not only to the Board's factual findings but
also to the legal principles enunciated by the agency. 9
Advantages of the Board's Operations
Analysis of the Board's decisions, observation of its procedures,
and discussion of its operations with active practitioners lead to the
conclusion that the Board makes its main contribution to municipal tax
administration in the discharge of its adjudicatory function. These
contributions are not limited to procedural improvements; consistent
and logical development of the substantive law has also been enhanced.
Procedural Advantages
(1) Economic Savings to Taxpayers
The adjudicative procedure provided by the Board is inexpensive
to the taxpayer. The Board imposes no filing fee, and, since the pro-
ceedings are informal, taxpayers may also save the expenses of securing
professional representation and of presenting witnesses for purely
formal proofs. The Board encourages stipulations and other devices
to avoid the taking of formal testimony.
(2) Prompt Disposition of Cases
Adjudications are generally rendered by the Board shortly after
the hearing.70  Certainly, cases before the Board are, on the average,
disposed of in far less time than comparable cases before the courts.
6 7 In the seventy-six cases passed upon by the courts, the Board's action was
ultimately reversed in only two (which governed one other in an appellate court and
four others in which the lower court decision was not appealed) ; it was affirmed in
fourteen (governing ten others) which went no higher than the common pleas courts
and in two (governing two others) in the appellate courts. Four cases were with-
drawn at the appellate level and one at the lower court level; two remained open in
appellate courts and thirty-one in the lower courts.6 8 E.g., Abner Michaud v. Bruton, Phila. Common Pleas No. 7, June Term
1957, No. 658, affirming Docket No. 80.04-91, Formal Op. No. 57-16, May 17, 1957;
In re National Sugar Ref. Co., Phila. Common Pleas No. 6, Dec. Term 1956, No.
6816, afflrming Docket No. 100.04-527, Formal Op. No. 57-1, Jan. 21, 1957.
69 E.g., Kelly v. Tax Review Bd., Phila. Common Pleas No. 6, March Term
1955, No. 2655, Docket No. 40.02-411, Formal Op. No. 55-11, April 13, 1955. Cf.
In re Hennessy, Phila. Common Pleas No. 3, March Term 1955, No. 6534, affirming
Docket No. 40.02-484, Formal Op. No. 55-13, May 11, 1955, in which the common
pleas court held that the findings of the Board were conclusive. See also Sharps
v. Revenue Comn'r, Phila. Common Pleas No. 3, June Term 1955, No. 9170, appeal-
ing Docket No. 30.02-507, Formal Op. No. 55-20, July 27, 1955, in which the common
pleas court remanded the matter to the Board with directions for it to secure an
expert opinion on the question of whether gain from the sale of a building was
"earned as a result of business activities" or merely derived from passive ownership
of property.
70 See note 45 mipra. The inconsistent requirements that the Board list and
hear all matters within ninety days of filing and that the Board should consider each
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(3) Fair and Flexible Procedure
Formal rules of evidence which are designed primarily to protect
litigants by preventing inexpert juries from being misled are not
necessary where the trier of fact is itself expert in the area. Thus,
the Tax Review Board permits greater leeway in the presentation of
evidence, as is the practice of most judges sitting without juries and
most administrative agencies.71 At the same time, the Board has
refused to abandon many traditional rules of legal procedure. Hear-
ings are adversary in nature with full scope for cross-examination and
confrontation. A record is made of the proceedings and the decisions
of the Board are, of course, reviewable by the courts.
Substantive Advantages
(1) Finality of Decision To Deter Wasteful Litigation
As noted above, few of the decisions of the Board are appealed
and, of those few, even fewer are reversed by the courts. Some of the
matters in controversy may involve amounts too small to justify the
expense and time involved in an appeal. As to questions of fact,
review by the courts is limited, not only because of the normal defer-
ence given to findings of fact by the tribunal which is able to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses and so to judge credibility, but also be-
cause the courts have recognized that the Board's flexible procedures
are likely to result in accurate factual findings. Weight has also been
accorded to the specialized knowledge and experience brought to taxa-
tion problems by the law and accounting members of the Board. It is
petition for review within a reasonable time probably stems from an oversight in
the amendment of the code. When the provisions were originally codified, the depart-
ment of collections was given the task of considering each petition for review within
a reasonable time, PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1702(3)
(1956), with its decision becoming final only after review, approval, or modification
by the Board. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1702(4)
(1956). When it became obvious that by poor draftsmanship the department had
been given the task of considering petitions for review of its own decisions, the
scheme was amended in the same year by transferring to the Board the tasks of
considering the petitions for review of the revenue commissioner's decisions. Phila-
delphia, Pa., Ordinance of June 5, 1956, § 2, 1956 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 278,
amending PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1702 (1956).
This was accomplished simply by substituting for the phrase "Department of Col-
lections" the term "Tax Review Board." As thus amended, the section still required
that such petitions be considered "within a reasonable time."
71 For example, hearsay rules are frequently relaxed. Accountants are permitted
to testify to facts and figures from books which they did not prepare and which
were not prepared under their direction, thus eliminating the need for bringing in
bookkeepers, other employees, and voluminous records to substantiate testimony.
The cost to the taxpayer of compiling such records and producing such witnesses
might easily exceed the amount in dispute. As the city may verify such testimony
through audit and investigation, no harm is done to the public. When the city dis-
putes the facts, the Board more strictly observes the rules of evidence.
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a reasonable assumption that a substantial amount of litigation has
been discouraged by the existence of an effective taxpayer remedy at
the administrative level.
(2) Improved Tax Administration at tke Collection Level
It is impossible, of course, to attribute any increase in tax revenues
directly to the existence of the Board. On the other hand, it is safe
to conclude that the Board has helped to improve tax enforcement
procedures by its fair and uniform treatment, devoid of political
favoritism.
(3) A Consistent Body of Tax Law
Perhaps the most important function which the Board serves is
that of providing an authoritative forum for the interpretation and
application of tax law. Many troublesome tax problems have been
settled. Because of the small number of appeals and an increasing
judicial deference to board opinions, the principles on which these
disputes have been resolved have developed into established precedents.
And an acceptance of these precedents by the courts has increased the
Board's authority as an interpreter of municipal tax law.
(4) Expertise at the Municipal Level
In its adjudicative role the Board serves a valuable function in
passing on questions of fact as well as in the construction of pertinent
municipal tax measures. To these tasks it brings an expertise based
on familiarity and professional background; in creating a record, deter-
mining the credibility of witnesses, weeding out frivolous arguments,
and abstracting the issues in controversy, the Board assists the courts
by framing for them a readily reviewable case, whether that review be
broad or narrow. And, in addition to providing citizens with a con-
venient forum, at little cost to the city, 2 the Board provides helpful in-
sights into the practical application of the taxing measures.
THE BoARD's CURRENT STATUS
Despite the Board's acknowledged value to tax administration in
a city of two million people, there are fundamental problems yet to be
solved concerning its future status. One of these is whether the
Board-which has, de facto, acted as an independent' adjudicatory
72The Board's annual budget is approximately $50,000. In addition, the city
provides office space and the services of an assistant city solicitor who attends hear-
ings, prepares briefs, and argues appeals.
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body and "made law" just as any other court or agency does-has, de
jure, the power to bind the city by its adjudications.7 The question
reduces itself to concrete terms when the touchy problem of the Board's
relation to Philadelphia's chief legal officer-the city solicitor-is con-
sidered.
The Charter specifies that the function of the solicitor's "law
department" is to furnish legal advice to all "officers, departments,
boards and commissions concerning any matter or thing arising in
connection with the exercise of their official powers or performance of
their official duties," ' and makes it the "duty" of any city agency
"requiring" legal advice to refer the issue to the law department. 5  In
fact, it is "unlawful for any officer, department, board or commission
73 Both the home rule charter and its history are vague as to the extent of the
Board's powers and the nature of its duties. PHrLADELPHIA HOmE RULE CHARTER
§ 3-100(f) created the Board as a departmental board in the department of collections.
The annotations state that all of the departmental boards are "connected, for the
purposes of fiscal administration, with those departments to which their functions
are most closely related." Although the Tax Review Board is not designated an
"independent board"--i.e., one "whose activities are not closely related to any par-
ticular department or are of such importance as to merit independent status"--this
does not eliminate the possibility that the Board is to be independent of the department
of collections in matters other than "fiscal administration." Moreover, the annotations
to PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE CHARTER § 6-207 reveal that the charter's framers
contemplated an agency to which taxpayers might "appeal decisions of the executive
branch" concerning their tax liability, so that tax disputes could be resolved "quickly
and with the least expense to the taxpayer and the City."
Some of those instrumental in the creation of the Board differ as to the source
of the idea and whether a municipal tax court was spedfically contemplated. The
chairman of the drafting committee, who as state attorney general had been a member
of the State Board of Revenue and Finance, believes that the Board was inspired
by the state agency. Interview With William A. Schnader, in Philadelphia, Pa.,
April 14, 1958; see Administrative Code of 1929, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 115, 322
(1942); Fiscal Code of 1929, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 504 (Supp. 1960). The
legislative draftsman of the Charter Commission's staff, who had experience with
the federal Board of Tax Appeals, suggests that the framers were attempting to
create an agency modeled after the Board of Tax Appeals of the United States.
Interview With Paul Wolkin, in Philadelphia, Pa., March 19, 1958. And the first
director of finance under the charter has expressed yet another view: "Clearly in the
mind of many of the members of the Charter Commission . . . was the thought
that we were planning against the day that the Board of Revision would be abolished
and this agency would take over the appeal and review functions in reassessment of
real and personal property." Memorandum From Lennox L. Moak to Stanford
Shmukler, note 1, July 20, 1959, on file at the Institute of Legal Research, University
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.
Because of controversy among the charter's draftsmen as to assigning a specific
role to the Board, the charter was intentionally vague. The problem of implementing
the charter mandate fell to City Solicitor Abraham L. Freedman, who in his prefatory
comments to this Article has indicated his recognition of the need for an effective
procedure to mediate disputes between citizen and sovereign taxing power. See
Freedman, Some Personal Reflections on the Establishment of the Philadelphia Tax
Review Board, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 663 (1961). His views are embodied in the form
of the original tax review board ordinance, which is not restricted to defining the
scope and functions of an agency whose primary purpose would be to adjudicate tax
disputes. On the contrary, the ordinance outlined a two-step procedure by which the
taxpayer first sought relief from the revenue commissioner and then was entitled
to board review or approval of the commissioner's decision.
74 PHILADELPIA HoME RULE CHARTER § 4-400.
'
75 PHILADELPHIA HoME RULE CHARTER § 8-410.
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to engage any attorney to represent him or it in any matter or thing
relating to his or its public business without the approval in writing of
the City Solicitor." 71
It can thus be seen that the solicitor is, indeed, the city's chief law
officer-not only its advocate, but in a sense, so far as city officials are
concerned, the final tribunal to interpret the principles of law governing
the performance of the various municipal agencies. This centralization
and subordination of all city government to the solicitor's power to
interpret the law has been examined and confirmed by one court in an
interesting case, which, however, fell outside the tax field.7 7  But
would the Tax Review Board, like other boards, be "required" to
"take its law" from the solicitor if a direct conflict between them
should arise?
The city's Code of General Ordinances provides,"8 as did the orig-
inal tax review board ordinance,7 9 that the law department shall act as
the legal adviser to the Tax Review Board. The department also acts
as legal adviser to the department of collections.8" Acting in this latter
capacity a city lawyer has always appeared before the Board; he has
been treated by the Board as one of the parties-as counsel to an
agency whose decision is being reviewed independently. While the ordi-
nances seem, literally, to place the city solicitor in the anomalous posi-
tion of having responsibility to supervise the agency before which he
also appears as a partisan advocate,8 the solicitor has, so far, refrained
from exercising that responsibility.
If the charter "requires" the Board to request the opinion of the
law department on every "legal issue" which arises before it, City
Planning Cornm'n v. Dunlap implies that the Board would be com-
pelled to follow the advice given. Such an interpretation would re-
duce the Board to a mere finder of fact-a sort of blue-ribbon jury
for tax disputes. Such an interpretation would also require someone-
Board or solicitor-to determine in the first instance whether a par-
ticular issue involved questions of fact or of law, or, more realistically,
76 Ibid.
77 City Planning Comm'n v. Dunlap, Phila. Common Pleas No. 5, June Term
1956, No. 1802.
78 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CoDE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1701 (1) (c) (1956).
79 Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board Ordinance § 4(c), Sept. 9, 1953, 1953
PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 480.
8 0 
PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE CHARTER §§ 4-400, 8-410. See also Tax Rev.
Bd. Regs. art. 2(b), Feb. 5, 1954.
81 See Sharps v. Revenue Comm'r, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 463, 476 (C.P. 1956),
where the court seemed unaware of the Board's actual independence from control by
the law department; cf. Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. Gelder, 349 Pa. 1, 36 A.2d
444 (1944).
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of both; someone would have to unravel the jurisdictional issues, an
operation which might in itself lead to much litigation.
In practice, the Board has, since its creation, enjoyed excellent
rapport with the law department.8 2 The issue of who speaks the final
word on tax adjudication at the municipal level has simply been left
in abeyance for the time-being. By informal agreement the assistant
solicitor who appears before the Board has been an advocate only.
The city's law officer has never attempted to control the Board's de-
terminations on questions of law, and his briefs or memoranda of law
filed in specific cases have been given the same consideration as those
filed on behalf of the taxpayer.
Nevertheless, the present solicitor has expressed his personal
opinion that the Board lacks the power to render decisions on ques-
tions of law which would be binding on the department of collections
in the face of a contrary official opinion by the law department.8"
But both the Board and the solicitor seem agreed that the issue of
who has the ultimate power is open to serious question. 4
A second "jurisdictional" problem which has confronted the
Board is the extent to which it may pass on the constitutional validity
of the tax legislation upon which the cases before it are based. Can
the Board declare a tax unenforceable if it concludes that the legislation
is unconstitutional ? 85 Can it pass upon the validity of rules and regu-
82 See Freedman, supra note 73, at 668-69. Mr. Freedman's successor as city
solicitor is David Berger, who was one of the original members of the Board and
has served as its chairman and vice chairman. The first chairman was Professor
Paul W. Bruton, a tax law specialist whose judicial temperament and intellectual
stature were major factors in obtaining for the Board its de facto status as an inde-
pendent adjudicatory agency and in establishing the fine rapport with the law depart-
ment. The incumbent chairman, Helen S. Chait, a former deputy city solicitor,
has maintained the high level of cooperation between both agencies.
83 Interview With David Berger, in Philadelphia, Pa., Nov. 19, 1957.
8 4 1n L.J.W. Realty Corp. v. Philadelphia, 390 Pa. 197, 201 n.2, 134 A.2d 878,
881 n.2 (1957) (the Second Realty Transfer Tax Case), the supreme court noted
the statement in the Board's opinion, City Stores Co., Docket No. 80.04-34, Formal
Op. No. 56-18, July 25, 1956, that the Board viewed itself as lacking power to pass
on the validity of city ordinances; the court, however, gave no indication of its own
conclusion on the subject. Although the Board has refused to pass on the validity
of ordinances, see, e.g., C. J. Devine & Co., Docket Nos. 40.04-485, 110.04-17, Formal
Op. No. 55-22, Dec. 1, 1955, it has on many occasions interpreted ordinances and
applied them as so interpreted. E.g., Harry C. Dalton, Docket No. 30.05-C694,
Formal Op. No. 59-3, Jan. 7, 1959; Mount Vernon Corp., Docket Nos. 40.02-658,
-659, Formal Op. No. 56-15, July 18, 1956, af'd, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 479 (C.P. 1957)
(whether mass production and sale of prefabricated houses constitutes manufacturing
within mercantile license tax) ; James A. Quaid, Docket No. 30.02-351, Formal Op.
No. 55-3, Jan. 27, 1955, rev'd, 188 Pa. Super. 623, 149 A.2d 557 (1959) (whether
sale of nonresident partner's share to remaining partner constitutes income under
Philadelphia income tax).
85 The Board has questioned whether a municipal agency can declare a state
statute to be invalid, C. J. Devine & Co., Docket Nos. 40.04-485, 110.04-17, Formal
Op. No. 55-22, Dec. 1, 1955, appeal dismissed, Phila. Common Pleas No. 4, Dec.
Term 1955, No. 2686, aff'd, 184 Pa. Super. 297, 134 A.2d 238 (1957), and has noted
that city council did not specifically give authority to the Board to pass on the
validity of taxes levied by council. See, e.g., Second Realty Transfer Tax Case, supra
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lations promulgated by the department purportedly interpreting such
legislation? " The issue is important to taxpayers who may find
their right of appeal to the courts irretrievably lost for failure to exhaust
their administrative remedies."s It is also significant in measuring the
Board's independence from, and its authority over, decisions of other
city agencies. The code is silent on the issue,"s and the courts have
by-passed it. 9
note 84; Manheim Laundry Co., Docket No. 40.02-A462, Formal Op. No. 57-9,
March 7, 1957; Albright & Friel, Inc., Docket No. 40.02-545, Formal Op. No. 56-2,
March 2, 1956. But cf. Norton, Lilly & Co., Docket Nos. 30.02-A976, 40.02-A735,
Formal Op. No. 57-25, Oct. 4, 1957. The Board has, on the other hand, interpreted
the code as repealing an earlier ordinance, but refused to pass on the validity of that
code section. Holmes Elec. Protective Co., Docket No. 90.04-8, Formal Op. No.
59-13, July 9, 1959. On appeal the common pleas court held the code section invalid.
Phila. Common Pleas No. 3, June Term 1959, No. 3248. In Harry C. Dalton, Docket
No. 30.05-C694, Formal Op. No. 59-3, Jan. 7, 1959, the Board construed the code's
penalty provisions and rejected a contention that its interpretation would result in
unconstitutional retroactivity.
86While the Board has refused to rule on the extent of the rulemaking power
of the revenue commissioner, it has interpreted his regulations as inapplicable to a
specific set of facts on the ground that to hold otherwise would cast doubt on the
validity of the regulations. See Fred M. Simon, Docket No. 30.04-17, Fred M.
Simon, Jr., Docket No. 30.04-18, Richard K. Simon, Docket No. 30.04-19, Formal
Op. No. 54-11, Dec. 9, 1954, on rehearing, Formal Op. No. 55-14, May 13, 1955. In
the following cases the regulations were held to be a reasonable interpretation of the
ordinance in question: Dr. Arthur Steinberg, Docket No. 30.02-6, Formal Op. No.
57-21, July 12, 1957, .pplementing Formal Op. No. 55-21, Sept. 15, 1955; Insurance
Situs Cases, Docket Nos. 40.01-856 to -860, -867, -898, -905, Formal Op. No. 56-9,
April 25, 1956, on rehearing, Formal Op. No. 56-29, Nov. 16, 1956; Slater System,
Inc., Docket Nos. 40.02-813, -814, Formal Op. No. 56-6, March 16, 1956.
87 See Boulevard Rink, Inc. v. Philadelphia, Phila. Common Pleas No 4, Dec.
Term 1959, No. 189; cf. Philadelphia v. Sam Bobman Dep't Store Co., 189 Pa. Super.
72, 149 A.2d 518 (1959). See also 1954 Ops. (PHLADELPHIA) CITY SoLIcIToR 25
(Formal Op. No. 108), which concludes that decisions of the department of licenses
and inspection could not be appealed to the courts until reviewed by the Board of
License and Inspection Review, inasmuch as the department decision does not become
final until so reviewed.
88 Note, however, that Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board Ordinance § 5(a),
Sept. 9, 1953, 1953 PHILADELPH A O I NANCES 480, provided that the commissioner
had the right to grant refunds of taxes paid under "an invalid law." This provision
could be interpreted to mean that the commissioner had power to make an initial
determination as to the validity of taxing laws, with his decision subject to review
by the Tax Review Board. A more likely interpretation, however, is that he was
directed to grant refunds after a law had been judicially declared by a competent
court to be invalid. At any rate, the provision was omitted in the codification.
89 in Tax Review Bd. v. C. J. Devine & Co., 184 Pa. Super. 297, 304, 134 A.2d
238, 242 (1957), the superior court implied that it was unimportant that the Board
had failed to express any judgment on an issue of constitutionality, since the lower
court and the superior court could and did deal with it. On the other hand, in
Boulevard Rink, Inc. v. Philadelphia, Phila. Common Pleas No. 4, Dec. Term 1959,
No. 189, where the only issue involved was one of constitutional proportions, the
court must have regarded the Board's judgment as carrying some weight; were this
not so, the requirement that the taxpayer exhaust his administrative remedies would
have been a vain ritual, for there is little in logic that would compel a litigant to
plead his case before a tribunal which had no power to decide it. See DAvis,
APINIsTRATVE LAW § 190, at 631-32 (1951). See also 1956 Ops. (PHiLADELPHIA)
CITY SOLIcITOR 56 (Formal Op. No. 191), in which the solicitor concluded that the
Board of License and Inspection Review, a departmental review board created by
the charter, has no right to decide constitutional issues and that the charter did not,
and could not, give such agency the right to decide the validity of ordinances and
regulations. It might be suggested that where a taxpayer contends that a statute
is unconstitutional on its face, as was the claim in the Devine and Boulevard Rink
1961l
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A related problem-again showing the uncertainty of the Board's
adjudicatory status-is whether the city has standing to appeal from
the agency's decisions. Since the creation of the Board, the city has
never attempted to appeal an adverse judgment; the issue is yet to be
raised; and the city code is ambiguous on the point.90 If the purpose
of the Board is simply to look over disputed charges imposed by the
city's collection officials, to correct improper calculations, to reduce in-
terest and penalties, and to make factual findings, then, arguably,
the city should have no right to question the Board's decisions, for
the Board would in fact be making the city's decisions. But if the
Board is viewed as having the power to make binding determinations of
law, free from the control of the city solicitor, then the city should be
authorized to appeal from board decisions when its officials believe
these decisions are wrong. Lacking an appeal the city might be bound
by bad decisions, or, alternatively, it might seek to ignore them; 1 in
cases, the Board may not have the power to declare invalid the entire act of the
legislature or of council without such power having been expressly provided by the
legislature; where, however, the question is whether the application of a taxing
measure might result in an unconstitutional extension of the taxing power of the city,
then the Board possesses the right to refuse to apply it in such a manner. This
suggested distinction stems from the direction by council in the code that "nothing
contained in this Title [Finance, Taxes and Collections] shall be construed to em-
power the City to levy or collect any tax not within the taxing power of the City
under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth." PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-510
(1956). Since the Board has no right to refuse to apply a tax measure in the manner
directed by council, whether or not it considers that measure valid, it cannot under-
take to determine whether it is valid. But since the council has indicated that it
does not intend its valid measures to extend beyond its constitutional powers, the
Board, if faced with the question of determining whether a specific activity falls
within the tax measure, must consider whether the effect would be to render it
unconstitutional. For a possible incipient distinction on these lines, see Norton,
Lilly & Co., 189 Pa. Super. 91, 149 A.2d 672 (1959). In Holmes Elec. Protective
Co., Docket No. 90.04-8, Formal Op. No. 59-13, July 9, 1959, the Board specifically
noted the distinction between passing on the constitutionality of legislation and of its
applicability to the particular facts.
90PHILADELPIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES §19-1706(2) (1956),
provides that decisions of the Board, except those pertaining to compromises and
waiver of interest or penalty which are made conclusive under § 19-1706(1), may
be appealed "to any court of competent jurisdiction within thirty days after the
mailing of notice of such decision or action to the petitioner or his attorney by the
Tax Review Board." (Emphasis added.) But § 19-1701(3) (d) provides that notice
of board decisions should be provided not only to the petitioner but also "to the
Department of Collections and any other City agency affected thereby." These two
provisions, taken together, might be regarded as implying that only the petitioner
has a right of appeal.
91 For example, if the city solicitor should disagree with a decision of the Board,
he could render a formal opinion or an "advance ruling" to the department of collec-
tions reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the Board, and advise the department
to comply with his opinion rather than that of the Board. City Planning Comm'n v.
Dunlap, Phila. Common Pleas No. 5, June Term 1956, No. 1802, suggests that the
department is required to follow the solicitor's opinion where the department is
obliged to seek his advice as to its official duties. Query whether the creation of
the Board has relieved the department of the duty to seek advice from the law depart-
ment about legal issues which might arise in tax collection affairs and whether it
is thus relieved of the effect of the Dunlap decision. Compare Merchants' Warehouse
Co. v. Gelder, 349 Pa. 1, 36 A.2d 444 (1944) (state executive officials exercising
quasi-judicial function not bound by conclusions of attorney general).
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either event, taxpayers and the public interest in fair tax administration
would suffer.
In my opinion, the most important function of the Board-one
which it has creditably fulfilled-is adjudicating tax disputes, both as
to fact and law. It seems appropriate, therefore, that its power to do
so, free from the control of the city's legal representative, should be
specifically spelled out by the legislature, and that the Board's value
in deciding questions of constitutionality of application of tax laws
should be given legislative recognition. And, conversely, the right
of the city's collection agency, through the city solicitor, to question
the Board's decisions by appeal to the courts should be specifically
recognized.
A MUNICIPAL TAx CouRT?
The complex revenue structure of the city, giving rise to a large
volume of taxpayer disputes, evidences the need for some agency to
interpret and unravel the many provisions of the tax laws; it is this
need which the Board has been filling by operating as a de facto mu-
nicipal tax court. To insure that this need continues to be satisfied,
the organic legislation creating the Board should be modified to define
and broaden its adjudicatory jurisdiction; 92 to provide that appeals
from its decisions be taken directly to an appellate court; 93 to define
and limit the scope of court review of its decisions; " to modify the
92 Its jurisdiction should include matters presently within the realm of the Board
of Revision of Taxes and the school district. See notes 113-20 infra and accompanying
text.
93 The code presently provides that appealable matters may be appealed to "any
court of competent jurisdiction." See note 90 supra. However, nothing in the code
or statutes specify the court or courts to which these appeals should be taken. As a
matter of practice, appeals are taken to the courts of common pleas, regardless of the
amount of the controversy. This is true even though the municipal court has juris-
diction of civil cases involving less than $5,000. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 693 (Supp.
1960). The common pleas courts have broad jurisdiction under the state constitution
and appropriate legislation, PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 6, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 251,
282 (1930), and have promulgated the following rule: "Uuless otherwise provided by
law, by the rules or by special order of the court, the practice and procedure in appeals
from administrative agencies of the City of Philadelphia . . . from which appeals
are allowed by law, shall be taken and prosecuted in the same manner as provided
in Rules 1 to 13 of these rules . . . ." Pan.A. C.P.R. 1*(a).
94 At the present time the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which are
deemed to govern appeals from administrative agencies, provide: "Appeals shall be
heard by the court upon the record and the exceptions filed thereto. No question
shall be heard or considered by the court which was not raised at the hearing before
the agency, except (a) questions involving the validity of a statute or the procedure
before the agency; (b) questions involving the jurisdiction of the agency over the
subject matter of the adjudication; and (c) questions which the court is satisfied
that the appellant could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have raised before the
agency. If, upon the hearing before the court it is satisfied that any such additional
question should be so raised it shall remand the record to the agency for further
hearing on the additional question." PA. R. Civ. P. 8. When first enacted, the tax
review board ordinance provided that findings of fact should be final and conclusive
and not the subject of further review by any court. Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review
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composition of the Board and the qualifications and tenure of its mem-
bers in order that its membership might be insulated from executive
pressure and partisan politics; and to curtail or eliminate its nonadju-
dicatory functions. In order to make the Tax Review Board a mu-
nicipal tax court in law as well as in fact, legislation and action at
both the state and local levels would be required.95 The concept of a
municipal agency with adjudicatory functions in tax matters is unique, 6
although there are counterparts at the federal " and state levels."
Constitutional Questions
There seems to be little doubt that the legislature could constitu-
tionally denominate the Tax Review Board a "court" and could invest
it with judicial powers. 9 The state constitution specifically gives the
legislature the power to establish new courts ... and limits this power
only by a provision which states:
All laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform opera-
tion, and the organization, jurisdiction and powers of all courts
Board Ordinance § 10, Sept. 9, 1953, 1953 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCEs 483. This
provision was omitted from the code. At the present time nothing is said in the code
or the rules of civil procedure about the scope of review: although it is not de novo,
the courts have rendered varying degrees of deference to decisions by the Board.
Cf. cases cited notes 67-69 stpra; Sharps v. Revenue Comm'r, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d
463, 474-76 (C.P. 1956).
95 Those measures dealing with the composition of the Board, qualifications of
its members, in some respects its jurisdiction, its procedures, the extent of appeals
from its decisions, and so forth, could be achieved by councilmanic action. For an
expression of a judicial opinion that ordinances passed under the home rule charter
have, within limits, the effect of statutes, see Philadelphia v. Sam Bobman Dep't
Store Co., 189 Pa. Super. 72, 81-82, 149 A.2d 518, 523 (1959). However, those
measures relating to the court to which appeal should be taken, the scope of that
appeal and the deference to be given to the Board's decisions, the right to pass on
the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances, the right to pass upon matters
affecting state-levied taxes such as the property and school district taxes, would
require action by the state legislature.
96Letter From Board of Municipal Finance Officers to Bernard L. Segal,
Sept. 12, 1959, on file at the Institute of Legal Research, University of Penn-
sylvania, Philadelphia, Pa. However, on the local level, the home rule charter also
created two other departmental boards with review functions, both within the depart-
ment of licenses and inspections: the Board of License and Inspection Review and
the Zoning Board of Adjustment. See PHILADELPHrA HOME RULE CHARTER §§ 5-1005,
-1006. Also on the local level is the Board of Revision of Taxes, which reviews
decisions of valuation made by assessors in the assessment of property. However,
this review is merely a method for establishing a final valuation-it is not a device
for adjudicating controversies between citizens and the agency responsible for the
decision in issue.
97The Tax Court of the United States, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7441-93.
98 The Board of Revenue and Finance, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 501-06
(1949), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 72, §§ 503-05 (Supp. 1960).
99 Cf. note 160 infra. But cf. 1956 Ops. (PHILADELPHIA) CITY SoLICITOR 57-58,
in which the solicitor concludes that an interpretation of § 5-1005 of the home rule
charter granting to the Board of License and Inspection Review the power to pass
on constitutional issues or the validity of ordinances or regulations might violate
PA. CONsT. art. V, § 1, which vests the judicial power in specified courts.
100 PA. CoNsT. art V, § 1.
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of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law, and the
force and effect of the process and judgments of such courts, shall
be uniform; and the General Assembly is hereby prohibited from
creating other courts to exercise the powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the judges of the courts of common pleas and orphans'
courts.101
These limitations have not prevented the legislature from exercis-
ing a wide range of discretion when dealing with the state's judicial sys-
tem.' O For example, the legislature may deal separately and specially
with the courts of Philadelphia County and of Allegheny County,
10 3
and, indeed, it has done so in establishing the Municipal Court of Phil-
adelphia 04 and the Allegheny County Court.0 5  Nor has the "same
grade or class" limitation been troublesome-the municipal court and
the county court have simply been viewed as courts of novel grades or
classes. 08 Thus, as far as Philadelphia is concerned, the first limita-
tion on the legislature's power-that legislation dealing with, and that
the organization and jurisdiction of, courts of the same grade or class
must be uniform-prohibits only the creation of a court with juris-
diction substantially identical to that of the courts of common pleas
(or other existing courts), but with a differing organic structure.1
0 7
The only legislative attempt to establish a judicial body which has
run afoul of the constitutional limitations was the Family Court Act
of 1937.108 There the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that:
1 0 1 PA. CONsT. art. V, § 26.
102 Cf. Klaus, The Pennsylvania Habeas Corpus Act of 1951, Its Effect on
Philadelphia Procedure, 26 Tmsp. L.Q. 32, 36 (1952): "The interpretation of the
doctrine of separation of powers . . . indicates a further clouding of an already
nebulous doctrine. That the doctrine itself is firmly established in Pennsylvania
cannot be doubted. But Com. v. Andrews, Com. v. Hopkins, and Com. v. Green have
succeeded in developing a rule of law allowing the legislature almost full discretion
in dealing with the jurisdiction of the courts .... ."10 3 PA. CONST. art. V, § 6, makes a special provision for the common pleas
courts of Philadelphia and Allegheny counties, and the supreme court has recognized
the general assembly's right to legislate on the basis of the constitutional classifi-
cation. See Gottschall v. Campbell, 234 Pa. 347, 352-57, 83 Atl. 286, 288-89 (1912);
City of Wilkes-Barre v. Meyers, 113 Pa. 395, 6 Atl. 110 (1886).
104 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 681-701 (1930), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
fit. 17, §§ 681-704 (Supp. 1960), Gerlach v. Moore, 243 Pa. 603, 90 AUt. 399 (1914).
10 5 
PA. STAT. ArNr. tit. 17, §§ 621-55 (1930), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 17,
§§ 625-47 (Supp. 1960), Gottschall v. Campbell, 234 Pa. 347, 83 At. 286 (1912).
106 See Gerlach v. Moore, 243 Pa. 603, 610-11, 90 At. 399, 401 (1914) ; Gottschall
v. Campbell, supra note 105.
107 "[W]e expressly ruled that for court purposes Allegheny County was in one
legislative class and Philadelphia in another, and, in effect, that the jurisdiction of
a court need only be uniform with that of other courts of the same grade in the
county or counties constituting the class in question . . . ." Gerlach v. Moore,
243 Pa. 603, 611-12, 90 At. 399, 401 (1914) (Moschzisker, J., concurring).
108 Pa. Laws 1937, act 107. The act provided, inter alia, that the family court
should have all the powers of a court of record possessed by the courts of common
pleas and quarter sessions of the peace; that judges of the family court might be
called upon to sit in courts of common pleas, quarter sessions, and general jail de-
livery; and that the judges of the family court should receive a salary of $14,000 per
year-the same as that received by judges of the courts of common pleas.
19611
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[T]he Family Court Act provides for a court and for judges of
the same class or grade as the common pleas . . . . As the Con-
stitution limits the common pleas of Philadelphia to three judges
and as the Family Court Act provides for a court of the same
class or grade but with four judges, the Act is in conflict with
section 26 of the fifth article requiring that such courts "so far as
regulated by law, and the force and effect of the process and
judgments of such courts, shall be uniform." 10
The second constitutional limitation-that no other courts may be
created to exercise the constitutional powers of the judges of the com-
mon pleas and orphans' courts-has proven scarcely more debilitating
to the legislature's wide discretion. It does not refer to the jurisdic-
tion of those courts but rather to the powers held by their judges,
"for example, the power of sitting in oyer and terminer." 110 The
limitation "does not directly vest any powers in the courts of common
pleas which may not be taken away by law." "'
Inasmuch as the Tax Review Board, as a municipal tax court,
would possess jurisdiction limited solely to matters related to the tax
laws, it does not seem that such a court could be regarded as "of the
same grade or class" as any existing court. And having escaped the
strictures of that limitation, it could then be structured in any way
that the legislature should see fit. Nor would vesting the Board with
jurisdiction over tax matters contravene the second constitutional lim-
itation, for that provision relates not to the jurisdiction of existing
courts but rather to the powers of the judges of those courts.
Jurisdictional Problems
There exist within the governmental framework agencies with
adjudicatory functions similar to those of the Board, with the result
that activities are duplicated and the forums in which taxpayers must
seek relief are multiplied. The success of the Board, deriving from
its expertise and its general acceptance by practitioners, leads to the
conclusion that some of these adjudicatory tasks could be transferred
to the Board. There also exist agencies to which could be transferred
some of the Board's other functions, thereby increasing its value in
adjudication without endangering existing safeguards in the city's
revenue structure.
109 Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti v. Sutton, 327 Pa. 337, 348, 193 Atl. 250,
255 (1937). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Kelley v. Brown, 327 Pa. 136, 193 Atl.
258 (1937).
110 Gottscball v. Campbell, 234 Pa. 347, 358, 83 Atl. 286, 290 (1912).
M11 Ibid.
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Property Taxes and the Valuation Function
The Board of Revision's assessment function 112 embraces not
only the valuation of property, both real and personal, but also the
determination of taxability,1 3 such as deciding whether a person is
a resident, whether specific forms of personal property fall within the
classes enumerated in the tax act, and whether proper procedures have
been followed. Once all the administrative and court remedies pro-
vided by the legislature in the assessment and personal property tax
laws 114 have been exhausted, the Board of Revision certifies to the
department of collections the assessment multiplied by the current rate,
which is the tax due. When the department thereafter makes an at-
tempt to collect the tax, the taxpayer could raise issues before the Tax
Review Board, collaterally attacking the decision of the Board of
Revision. In several instances where this was done, the Tax Review
Board refused to review the assessment on grounds of lack of juris-
diction." 5 Under existing legislation, the city would seem to have no
power to permit its agency to review a state-imposed tax."' The only
112 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5341.1-.21 (Supp. 1960). In counties other
than Philadelphia, the assessment boards are known by other names. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, §5452.1 (1950) (for counties of second class: Board of Property
Assessment, Appeals, and Review); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5342 (1950) (for
counties of third class: Board for Assessment and Revision of Taxes); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 72, § 5453.102 (1950) (for counties of fourth to eighth classes, a "board
for the assessment and revision of taxes"). See generally General County Assess-
ment Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5020-1 to -602 (1950), as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. fit 72, §§ 5020-201 to -518.1 (Supp. 1960).
113 This function of the Board of Revision is especially important with regard
to the personal property tax. See Note, 103 U. PA. L. Rxv. 391, 395-406 (1954).
114See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
15 Henry P. Schneider, deceased, Docket Nos. 60.04-26 to -29, Formal Op. No.
58-10, Dec. 3, 1958; Anna A. McManus, Docket No. 70.02-45, Formal Op. No. 56-19,
July 25, 1956; Frances I. Marshall, Docket No. 70.02-44, Formal Op. No. 56-14, July 18,
1956. The original tax review board ordinance, Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board
Ordinance § 4(b), Sept. 9, 1953, 1953 PHILADELPIffIA ORDINANcEs 479-80, specifically
provided that the Board should not have jurisdiction over any matters within the
jurisdiction of the Board of Revision of Taxes. This provision was omitted from
the codification. While no legislative history is available to explain the omission,
the first chairman of the Tax Review Board recalls discussing this problem with the
assistant city solicitor who prepared this portion of the code, and who expressed the
opinion that since the Board did not possess the power, it was mere surplusage to
state that fact in the code. Interview With Paul W. Bruton, in Philadelphia, Pa.,
Aug. 26, 1959. Cf. 1952 Ors. (PHlLADELPHIA) CITY SoLIcIToR 133 (Formal Op.
No. 57), in which the solicitor concluded that the Board of License and Inspection
Review has no jurisdiction to hear appeals in zoning matters, since to do so would
involve a collateral attack on decisions of the Zoning Board of Adjustments. See
also Henry P. Schneider, supra.
116 The taxes on real estate and personal property are both imposed under state
law, with their incidence and manner of assessment and collection specified by the
general assembly, even though the actual rates for the real estate tax are established
by the city council, and even though the proceeds of both taxes are for the benefit
of the county. See notes 11-12, 25 supra. The city council of Philadelphia presently
performs all of the functions formerly performed by the county government in
accordance with the City-County Consolidation Amendment, PA. CONsT. art. XIV,
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present jurisdiction of the Board would seem to be a review of action
by the department of collections, and this action does not include
valuation.1
1 7
Over the past half century there have been numerous attempts
to abolish the Board of Revision of Taxes."" In conjunction with
efforts to complete city-county consolidation, there have been demands
for the Board's abolition and for the assumption of its powers by some
appropriate agency of the city. If the Board of Revision should be
abolished, the initial valuation functions would still have to be carried
out by assessors; the review functions might best be assigned to a body
of men experienced in the field of real estate valuation." 9 For a va-
riety of reasons, the Tax Review Board might be well advised to stay
out of the field of reviewing valuations. 2 ' Accordingly, review of
valuation decisions should be for the courts or a special board of
experts. But all remaining decisions, such as those concerning tax-
ability or interest and penalties, would be peculiarly within the ex-
pertise of the Tax Review Board; that Board would thus be the most
logical repository for the functions of reviewing the decisions of any
substitute assessing body relating to such problems.
§ 8. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13151-57 (1949). However, the Home Rule
Enabling Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13133 (1957), specifically prohibits the city
from exercising any powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers
granted by acts of the general assembly which provide for the assessment of real
or personal property and persons for taxation purposes. Thus, despite a judicial
intimation that ordinances passed by the city under the home rule charter have the
status of acts of the general assembly, see Philadelphia v. Sam Bobman Dep't Store
Co., 189 Pa. Super. 72, 149 A.2d 518 (1959), it does not seem to be within the power
of city council to modify assessment procedures relating to the property taxes.
117 See text following notes 27-30 supra.
11 See Commonwealth ex rel. Truscott v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 367, 111 A.2d
136 (1955); Clark v. Meade, 377 Pa. 150, 104 A.2d 465 (1954); Freedman, supra
note 73, at 663-64.
119 Valuation of real estate involves an ultimate value judgment which, although
subjective, is based on recognized principles of appraisal. At the present time any
taxpayer aggrieved by a valuation decision of an assessor is entitled to a hearing
before the Board of Revision, whose decision is in turn subject to de novo review in
the courts of common pleas. But ideally, such a reviewing board should be composed
of men possessing expertise in real estate valuation, and could be authorized to serve
the functions of creating a record, passing on the credibility of witnesses, including
appraisers testifying for the taxpayers, and abstracting the issues for possible court
review.
120 Review of valuation of real estate requires an expertise not usually possessed
by lawyers, accountants, and tax specialists; such expertise as is possessed by members
of the Tax Review Board relates to interpretation of tax legislation and would be
of little value in making judgments in the real estate area. If the body of experts
selected to replace the Board of Revision is given the functions suggested in note
119 supra (similar to those of the Tax Review Board), then no advantage would
be derived from subjecting that body's decisions to review either by the Tax Review
Board or by the court of common pleas. And to vest the reviewing function in the
Tax Review Board would burden its dockets with multitudinous appeals and might
subject it to improper political pressures and temptations-always a danger when
subjective determinations are involved.
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Overlapping and Duplicated Functions
Licenses and Fees
The department of licenses and inspection makes initial deter-
minations of liability for the various licenses and fees imposed under
city ordinances, including those imposed for amusement permits and
mercantile licenses. Its decisions are subject to review by the Board
of License and Inspection Review.J21  However, liability for the mer-
cantile license fee is imposed only upon those liable for the tax itself,'22
as determined initially by the department of collections, and is there-
fore subject to review by the Tax Review Board. To date there has
been no appreciable conflict of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the
Board of License and Inspection Review possesses no particular ex-
pertise with respect to the subjects of the ordinances which it applies-
that is, those pertaining to auctions, bowling alleys, and mechanical
amusement devices. Liability for such permits involves generally the
same type of issues as are involved in any other municipal tax or charge
regularly considered by the Tax Review Board. It would seem ap-
propriate, therefore, to transfer to that body the task of passing upon
these problems.
School Taxes
The state legislature imposes for the benefit of the school district
of Philadelphia a real estate tax,'2 a personal property tax, 24 and a
general business tax,"2 all of which have counterparts in the city's tax
system. The real estate and personal property taxes are assessed by
the Board of Revision and are collected by the department of collections
on behalf of the school board. 2 ' However, the school revenue com-
missioner is nominally responsible for the collection of the school taxes
and his office has its own solicitor who makes decisions as to liability
12 1 PHILADELPHIA Homs RULE CHARTER § 5-1005.
122 The code requires "every person desiring to engage in or to continue to
engage in any business" to procure a mercantile license for each place of business
from the department of licenses and inspections. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF
GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1002(1) (1956). It also requires the payment of an
annual mercantile license tax by every person engaged in any business. PHILADEL-
PHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1003 (1956). Decisions as to who is
subject to the latter provision are made by the department of collections.
12 3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 6-655 (1949). These are collected in conjunction
with the county tax on such property. See note 11 supra.
12 4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, §§ 581.1-.16a (1950), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, §§ 581.1-.16a (Supp. 1960). See note 12 Mtpra.
125 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 584.1 (Supp. 1960). This is a counterpart of the
mercantile license tax.
'26 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-506 (1956).
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for these taxes without always consulting the law department and
without always agreeing with the latter's conclusions.
These decisions of the school revenue commissioner do not come
within the jurisdiction of the Tax Review Board. Thus, while ques-
tions of liability for the general business tax involve issues identical to
those involved in the mercantile license tax cases, taxpayers must
argue their petitions in two different adjudicatory bodies and face the
possibility of two different conclusions. Sound principles of adminis-
trative practice would justify submitting all such issues to one review-
ing agency. Under the existing charter and laws, the Tax Review
Board probably could not pass upon school district tax problems, inas-
much as the school district and its taxes are creatures of the general
assembly; the same problems of jurisdiction arise as are presented in
connection with taxes assessed by the Board of Revision.127 But if
the Tax Review Board serves a valuable function for the city, then it
could-if properly authorized-serve the same valuable function for
the school district at small additional cost.
The Auditing or "Watchdog" Functions
The Board has not and probably cannot under existing legislation
serve as effectively as a "watchdog" over the department of collections'
disbursements from the public treasury as it does as an adjudicator
of taxpayer-city disputes. From the beginning of its operations on
January 1, 1954, until December 31, 1958,12 the Board received 7,625
requests for approval of refunds. In few instances did the Board
schedule a hearing on these requests; it is estimated that in less than
two per cent did the Board modify the request, and seldom did it
totally reject the request. Infrequently has Board action been invoked
to prevent the department from establishing a financially unsound
precedent or from disbursing funds where not authorized by law. The
most important action, both financially and precedentially, was that
taken in the Insurance Situs cases.' 29 In those cases, insurance agents
who had included in their mercantile license tax returns premiums for
risks located outside the city requested the department for refunds of
the amount collected on such risks. The department, advised in-
formally by an assistant city solicitor, recommended granting such re-
funds. In a preliminary examination of the petition for approval-
127 See note 116 mtpra.
128 See the annual reports of the Board from 1954 to 1958.
129A number of petitions raised the same issue and were disposed of by the
Board in one proceeding. Insurance Situs Cases, Docket Nos. 40.01-856 to -860, -867,
-898, -905, Formal Op. No. 56-9, April 25, 1956, on rehearing, Formal Op. No. 56-29,
Nov. 16, 1956.
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which involved substantial sums of tax-the Board felt that the law
did not justify the refunds and sent the approval request back to the
department for further clarification. The assistant city solicitor per-
sisted in his position and the approval request was again forwarded to
the Board; a hearing was held and the request was denied. The tax-
payers appealed, but the Board's action was affirmed in the court of
common pleas.'3 0
The insurance cases are an atypical example of the exercise of the
auditing function, inasmuch as the Board does not investigate or con-
firm the facts but merely reviews the intended application of the law-
an application advocated by both the law department and the depart-
ment of collections, as well as the taxpayer. This type of Board action
fits more closely into the category of adjudicating than it does into
auditing-even though it must be conceded that it was the Board's
watchfulness which provided the opportunity for adjudication.
The failure of the Board to schedule hearings or to modify a
substantial number of refund requests may not reflect its full influence
as a watchdog, for in many instances the Board, on discovering some
apparently incorrect decision by the department, returns the request
for departmental reconsideration, informally indicating that it would
probably reject the request. The department is then free to modify its
decision, entering a compromise with the taxpayer if appropriate, or
refusing refund and permitting the taxpayer to file a petition for ap-
peal from its decision. Since the taxpayer can be then fairly sure of
the Board's position on the legal issue involved, it is usually to his
advantage to enter into any compromise proffered by the department
or to attempt to prove that there are other facts which place him out-
side the Board's tentative conclusion.
Even considering these circumstances, however, the Board's role
is limited. In passing on these requests, the Board is not normally
performing an adjudicatory task.'31 Although adjudication is some-
what similar-in that the Board must determine in part whether the
department has correctly interpreted and applied the tax measure to
the facts before it, the Board must also recognize that the facts and
analysis of the law presented to it represent an ex parte, and unavoid-
130 The appeals filed in several common pleas courts were consolidated and were
disposed of by Court of Common Pleas No. 1 without an opinion. Phila. Common
Pleas No. 1, Dec. Term 1956, Nos. 1367, 1372.
3
3 1 Normally there is no "dispute" to adjudicate and no adversaries, since both
taxpayer and department of collections presumably agree that the refunds should be
granted. In the Inmirance Situs cases, for example, both the taxpayer and the de-
partment, advised by the city solicitor, felt that the refunds should be granted. It
was the Board, at the suggestion of one of its members, which reviewed the legal
ramifications and requested the taxpayer and the city to present argument justifying
the right to the refunds.
19611
700 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ably self-serving, statement by the agency whose decision is to be
reviewed. The Board has no staff to investigate the validity of the
facts set forth in the taxpayer's petition or in the department's request
for approval, nor do the taxpayer or his witnesses appear before the
Board, unless a hearing is scheduled by the Board. Furthermore, the
charter and the code provide no adequate standard for guiding the
Board in determining whether to approve a department request. And
the ordinance is silent as to whether the Board, in refusing approval,
must find that the department was arbitrary or capricious, or only that
the department was incorrect, in its ruling that there had been a mis-
take of fact or law, or that the law under which the tax was paid was
invalid.'
Similarly, the Board has played a smaller role in approval of
compromises than in its adjudicatory function. The Code of General
Ordinances, requiring only that the petitioner set forth facts which
warrant a finding that the compromise is "in the best interest of the
City," ' sets forth no specific standards for the department to con-
sider in granting or withholding approval. Nor has the Board itself
attempted to define more explicitly what is in the city's best interest.
The Board does not have the facilities to investigate the accuracy of
the facts set forth in the petition; the most it can do is review the
validity of the facts on their face. And seldom is a hearing held. The
net result of this activity (or lack of it), added to the denial of power
to the Board to review refusals of compromise, is to place in the de-
partment of collections an essentially unpoliced power. Refusals, of
course, are completely uncontrolled; and the department's agreements
on compromise are controlled only so far as it is possible to do so on
the basis of a statement of facts adopted by department and taxpayer.
Even should the Board lay down more specific criteria-such as
whether liability is questionable, whether collectibility is in doubt,
whether litigation will prove more costly than the revenue it could pro-
132 When first enacted, the tax review board ordinance instructed the revenue
commissioner to grant refunds in whole or in part upon a determination that the
sum has been paid "under a mistake of law or fact or under an invalid law." Phila-
delphia, Pa., Tax Review Board Ordinance § 5(a), Sept. 9, 1953, 1953 PHILADELPHIA
ORDINANCES 48. This requirement was omitted in the codification and no standard
was substituted for it. In the argument of the case of Sharps v. Revenue Comm'r,
10 Pa. D. & C.2d 463 (C.P. 1956), the assistant city solicitor stated that the omission
was inadvertent. The requirement was restored by Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance of
Feb. 27, 1957, 1957 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 120.
133 PHILADELpHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1704(1) (1956).
See note 32 supra. The omission from the code of the word "financial" which ap-
peared in the phrase "best financial interests of the City" in the original ordinance
resulted from a request by the Board, with the approval of the department of col-
lections and the law department, to permit the Board to consider matters such as
doubtful liability, collectibility, public relations, and the equities on the side of the
taxpayer. Interview With Emanuel S. Wolfson, in Philadelphia, Pa., Jan. 5, 1961.
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duce, and whether litigation would be such a hardship on the taxpayer
as to subject tax enforcement to justified criticism-it could currently
enforce such criteria in only a limited number of situations.
If the Board is properly to perform the pre-audit function of
reviewing refund and compromise requests, several legislative changes
are necessary. Adequate standards should be provided, although they
might be of a general nature. For example, in contested refund appeal
cases, the Board applies a test analogous to the doctrine of unjust
enrichment-it will grant a refund petition where the taxpayer has
made a payment to which the City was not legally entitled, whether
paid under mistake of fact or law, under an invalid ordinance or reg-
ulation, or under an improper interpretation of the law. A similar
standard would seem proper in the case of requests for refund approval.
As to compromises, the power to review refusals of compromises should
be given to the Board. The factors to be considered in determining
what is "in the best interest of the City" should be illustrated, if not
enumerated. And the task of the Board in applying those standards
should be set forth. Should it be sufficient for the Board to limit its
inquiry to the nature and extent of the department's investigation of
the petitioner's allegations, and, if satisfied that the department has
adequately investigated the facts so as to protect the city from dis-
honest petitioners, grant the petition? Or should the Board be re-
quired to hold a hearing and receive sworn testimony as to the facts
allegedly justifying the refund or compromise? The latter alternative
would probably be a meaningless gesture and an unnecessary expense,
inasmuch as the facts would be uncontested and an appeal-necessi-
tating a reviewable record-is unlikely. Finally, there is a large vol-
ume of compromise approval requests, and most likely there would be
a similar volume of appeals from refusals; many in both categories
involve small amounts of money. Accordingly, to prevent cluttering
the Board's docket with items of little moment, a monetary limit should
be imposed below which such petitions would not require review.' 84
To the extent that the Board's watchdog function involves review
of the legality of refund payments or the disposition of legal questions
involved in refunds, it is related to its adjudicatory function. But to
serve as an effective auditor, the Board would have to play a much
more active role than it does at present-a role which could substan-
tially increase its burden and clog its dockets. Moreover, other officials
in the city framework-the city comptroller and the director of finance
1 3 4 For eXample, it has been estimated that if the Board were freed of the responsi-
bility for auditing petitions involving less than $250.00, more than one-half of the
current petitions would be included in this category. Interview With Emanuel S.
Wolfson, in Philadelphia, Pa., Jan. 5, 1961.
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-already perform an audit function with a special audit staff."'
It would require little, if any, extension of the functions of either of
these officials to include within their jurisdiction the auditing of re-
funds and compromises, not only from the accounting standpoint but
also from the legal where necessary: the task could probably be per-
formed effectively by an attorney attached to the office of the comp-
troller. While this attorney would not necessarily have the Board's
specialized knowledge and expertise, and while his decisions would
not have precedential value, few refund or compromise cases which
have been before the Board have required special expertise or have
resulted in the establishment of precedent.' 36
The Board's Equitable Clemency Function
The Governing Ordinances
All of the ordinances under which municipal taxes are imposed
provide heavy penalties and interest for nonpayment of taxes when
due.137  While the original tax review board ordinance established a
procedure by which a taxpayer could test the validity of taxes whether
or not he had paid the levy, it also provided that the filing of a peti-
tion for review should not stop the accrual of interest 3S--a provision
designed to encourage payment of taxes while the dispute was pending.
However, the ordinance went even further: it gave the department
of collections and the Board the right to consider the validity of inter-
est or penalties accrued on the principal amount of the tax or charge.'39
And in 1955 council gave the Board the additional power to abate in
whole or in part valid penalties or interest or both, where, in the
opinion of the Board, the taxpayer "acted in good faith without neg-
ligence and with no intent to defraud or evade the tax." "'
In the codification of the ordinance the following year, council
spelled out a procedure for petitioning the department solely for relief
135 PHILADELPHIA HOME RULE CHARTER § 3-201, -204, -1000, 6-100. Section
8-410 provides that before the law department can render any opinion interpreting
any appropriation ordinance or ordinance authorizing the expenditure of money, it
shall notify the city comptroller and afford him an opportunity to present his views.
136 On the other hand, to repose in a single individual, not at the cabinet level,
the power to audit such a large volume of small monetary transactions could lead to
temptation and corruption.
137 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-503 (1956).
138 Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board Ordinance § 6(a), Sept 9, 1953, 1953
PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 48. See PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE oF GENERAL ORDi-
NANCES § 19-1702(4) (1956).
'39 Philadelphia, Pa., Tax Review Board Ordinance §§4(a)(1)-(4), 1953
PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 478. The corresponding provisions in the code are
PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES §§ 19-1702(1), -1703(1), -1704(1)
(1956).
140 Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance of Dec. 27, 1955, 1955 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES
1142.
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from interest and penalty, without questioning the validity of the
principal charges.'41 The code removed the test of good faith, lack
of negligence, and intended evasion, and instead required only that
the petitioner set forth and certify facts which would warrant a finding
that the waiver of interest or penalty would be "just and equitable
and not prejudicial to the best interest of the City." 142 A scant six
months later, however, council reinstated the former tests of good
faith, lack of negligence, and no intent to defraud. 43 As it now reads,
the code permits the Board to grant relief from harsh interest and
penalty exactions where it is satisfied that the petitioner is not inten-
tionally or negligently attempting to deprive the city of revenue.
The Board's Role
The Board's role in determining whether to grant equitable relief
from these harsh penalties brings into play considerations quite dif-
ferent from those involved in its adjudicatory function. Here, prece-
dent and stare decisis are of little, if any, value. Whereas the inquiry
in adjudicating is whether the taxpayer falls within the taxing provi-
sions or their exemptions, the inquiry in dispensing clemency is
whether it is unfair to penalize the taxpayer for some admitted de-
ficiency in making a payment required by law.
No specific legislative authority currently exists for a petition
designed solely to test the validity of interest and penalty impositions;
that specific authority did exist for six months but then was removed
from the code. A literal reading of the current provisions suggests
that the validity of interest and penalty exactions can be questioned
only on a petition for review or appeal disputing the principal charge.
44
141 PHIlADFpHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1705 (1956).
142 PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1705(1) (1956).
143 Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance of June 5, 1956, 1956 PHILADELPHiA ORDINANCES
278, amending PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1705 (1956).
This was done at the request of the Board. For a discussion of the legislative history
and effect of this section, see Edward E. Kelly, Docket No. 40.04-B406, Formal Op.
No. 58-8, Oct. 21, 1958.
144 The code, in § 19-1705, provided a procedure for seeking relief from interest and
penalties without questioning the validity of the basic charges; but in 1956, the amend-
ment to the code provided simply: "Upon any petition for review or any appeal, the
Tax Review Board may abate in whole or in part interest or penalties, or both. .. ."
Philadelphia, Pa., Ordinance of June 5, 1956, 1956 PHILADELPHIA ORDINANCES 278.
(Emphasis added.) The code also provides that petitions for review, refunds, and
compromise relating to disputes over money or claims collectible by the department,
shall include but not be limited to "any tax, water or sewer rent, license fee or other
charge, and interest and penalties thereon." PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL
ORDINANCES §§ 19-1702(1), -1704(1) (1956). (Emphasis added.) A literal reading
of these sections leads to the conclusion that the Board can act only when a petition
for review or refund appeal petition is filed. If council intended the Board to hear
such matters independently of disputes relating to the principal claimed, it should
have omitted the emphasized portion of § 19-1705. Or it could have used the dis-
junctive "or" instead of the conjunctive "and" in the remaining sections.
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The Board, however, has exercised its rulemaking power 145 to pro-
vide a form of petition questioning only penalties and interest. Prior
to the introduction of this type of petition, the Board's dockets were
crowded with petitions for review and refund appeals in which there
was no substantial dispute over the principal charges, but which were
filed as the only means to obtain relief from the heavy interest and
penalty exactions. It was impossible for the Board to distinguish be-
tween true contested petitions and those seeking equitable relief. With
the new petition, hearings can be more efficiently scheduled and more
directly oriented toward the real issues in controversy. Moreover, the
making of a written transcript is not normally necessary where relief
is sought only from interest and penalties; where such cases are readily
identifiable, costs can be saved by dispensing with the services of the
official stenographer.
Since interest charges are designed to reimburse the city for not
having the use of money to which it is ultimately held entitled, there
seems to be no valid reason for granting relief, regardless of good
faith or intent, except perhaps where the taxpayer's failure to pay the
tax can be attributed to reliance on a prior board or court decision
which has been overruled or modified since the accrual of the tax. On
the other hand, penalties are designed to discourage nonpayment of
taxes when due; they mount rapidly, can become oppressively heavy,
and bear a pejorative connotation.'46 Therefore, there is ample justifi-
cation for granting relief from penalties when the standards of good
faith, care, and good intent are met. To date the Board has had little
difficulty in distinguishing petitions filed in good faith from those filed
merely to delay ultimate payment; petitions which set forth at least
prima facie grounds for review or appeal, which disclose reliance upon
competent advice, or which disclose honest and open negotiations with
the city are generally considered to be filed in good faith. Nonetheless,
the first chairman of the Board expressed a desire for legislative clari-
fication of the criteria upon which relief should be granted.
14 7
Legislative Clarification
In seeking legislative clarification of the provisions governing relief
from penalties, it is important to distinguish between two purposes for
145 Pursuant to authorization in PHILADELPHIA HOmE RULE CHARTER §§ 8-406,
-407, council has given the Board the right to make rules and regulations to implement
the code chapter dealing with the Board. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL
ORDINANCES § 19-1701(2) (a) (1956). The regulations were promulgated in 1954;
although no formal amendments have been made, the regulations have been sub-
stantially amended in practice.
14 6 Penalties are also intended to equalize the cost of collection of delinquent
taxes, which mounts with the period of delinquency.
147 Interview With Paul W. Bruton, in Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 26, 1959.
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which they are imposed. First is the encouragement of full, honest, and
timely disclosure of tax liability. Penalties for failure to make dis-
closure should be in the form of additions to the tax base, with
heavier penalties for wilful failure to file a return or to include taxable
items than for negligent failure to do so.14 If such penalties were im-
posed under municipal taxing ordinances, then the only task of the
Board would be the adjudicatory one of determining whether there
had been negligence or wilful attempt to evade taxation. A second
purpose for imposing penalties is to encourage prompt payment of
taxes. These penalties should mount as long as delinquencies continue
and should be imposed in addition to interest. As to such penalties
the Board should determine whether there has been negligence, fraud,
or intent to evade ultimate payment; if lateness is justifiable, then relief
should be granted.
Under present provisions of the law, there is some doubt as to
whether the tax collecting authorities have the right to grant relief from
interest and penalty impositions when payment is delayed, even if they
deem lateness to be excusable. The department has taken the position
that since the function of waiving interest and penalties has been given
to the Board, it does not exist in the department. On the other hand,
it has been suggested that this power coexists in the department as a
corollary to its tax collection duties.'49 At the present time the only
way the taxpayer can prevent interest and penalties from accumulating
is to pay the full amount of principal due; partial payment will not
suffice. Once a tax has become delinquent the department may not
accept partial payment of the principal without allocating a portion of
the payment to the interest and penalties due thereon; 150 in some
instances, however, the department will accept payment in full of the
delinquent principal, and this will toll the running of further interest
and penalties while the taxpayer petitions the Board for relief of in-
terest and penalties already accrued. The required allocation of partial
payments may be especially burdensome to the financially embarrassed
taxpayer, for the department will not enter into a compromise simply
because of financial hardship unless there is doubt as to the taxpayer's
liability or unless the taxpayer has ceased to do business as an entity.
This often penalizes an honest taxpayer who makes full disclosure of
148The legislature has provided for such increases to the tax base in the case
of persons who fail to file personal property tax returns, or who do not return all
of their taxable property therein. A twelve percent penalty is added to the tax base
in such instances. PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 72, § 4844 (1950). See Note, 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 391, 408, n.101 (1954). Likewise, the federal income tax imposes a 25% addition
to the tax base for negligence and a 50% addition for fraud. IxT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§6651(a), 6653(b).
'49 Interview With Paul W. Bruton, in Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 26, 1959.
:IO PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-504(1) (1956). But
see note 31 supra.
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his liability but is unable to pay his tax at the time due. If he survives
the financial straits and is finally able to pay, he must pay full interest
and penalty, without hope of relief from the department.15' On the
other hand, if a taxpayer fails to file a return at a time when he is
financially embarrassed, he is frequently able to make arrangements
with the department for payment of the principal due without interest
and penalties should a subsequent audit disclose his liability.
A large amount of the Board's time is taken up with the disposi-
tion of cases of this type. Moreover, the "technical staff" of the depart-
ment of collections, on behalf of the revenue commissioner, currently
performs a somewhat similar function, determining in which cases the
taxpayers should be granted relief in the form of a compromise of
liability. While those decisions are subject to review by the Board,
the initial decision by the technical staff is based at least partly on the
equities involved. It would be only a slight extension of the staff's
duties to grant it the power and responsibility to waive interest and
penalties in compliance with any legislative standards which might be
adopted. The Board could then serve as a "watchdog" in reviewing
these decisions as well. This suggestion is not novel: the code as first
enacted imposed on the department the function of waiving interest
and penalties, with its decisions subject to review by the Board and
the right reserved to the taxpayer to appeal to the Board the depart-
ment's refusal of waiver. 52 The power to abate interest and penalties
was later that year transferred to the Board. To return it to the
department now would probably result in a more efficient use- of the
time of both Board and department and a more logical division of the
duty to solve problems within the tax collecting authority.
Possible Advisory Functions
Advice to Government
It has been suggested by at least one observer of municipal
government that there is a need for a body of experts with specialized
151 This was the position taken by the department and repudiated by the Board
in Brookman, Docket Nos. 33.05-G789, 35.05-G790, 40.05-E414, Formal Opinion No.
60-12, July 1, 1960. There, taxpayers contended that they had made full disclosure
of their mercantile, net profits and wage withholding tax liability, but were unable
to pay the taxes when due because of other debts, including state and federal taxes,
taking priority. These debts resulted in termination of the partnership, with one of
the partners continuing the business and assuming all liabilities. Within a few years
and as soon as able, he paid the principal charges, and sought relief from the interest
and penalties. The department, through the technical staff, refused relief, contending
that it had no power to waive interest and penalties and that, if it were to treat this
as an offer of compromise, it did not consider it to be "in the best interest of the
City." On petitions for waiver, the Board abated the penalties on all taxes and one-
half of the interest on the net profits taxes.
352 PHILADELPHIA, PA., COD OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 19-1705 (1956) (as
originally enacted).
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knowledge of municipal revenue problems to serve as an advisory
board to the executive and legislative branches.' 53 To this board the
city council and the mayor could turn for advice on the practicality of
imposing new forms of taxation or for suggestions as to procedural
reforms. The advisory body could also reflect the views of prac-
titioners on tax and fiscal matters.
Providing advice to the legislative and executive branches on
matters of general tax and fiscal interest brings into play political
considerations which have no place in rendering judicial-or quasi-
judicial-adjudications of specific tax disputes between citizen and
sovereign. If a need exists for such a body on a continuing basis,'
the Tax Review Board-with its expertise in tax law and practice-
would seem to be the logical group to fill the need. However, in acting
as a political sounding board, the members must be aware that they
are wearing different hats than when they fill their other roles, and
they must be careful to doff those hats when they return to their other
functions.
In empowering the Board to render opinions on general fiscal mat-
ters when requested by the mayor or other governmental agencies, or
to volunteer such opinions when matters justifying such action come
to its attention, city council must be careful to assure the ability to
distinguish among the various hats worn by the board members. The
ordinance should make clear that in rendering such opinions the Board
may invoke political as well as judicial considerations and that the
opinions are advisory only, having no binding effect as to any present
or future dispute. Even these safeguards, however, might not prevent
the mixing of the Board's adjudicatory functions with political consid-
erations; any step taken, therefore, toward charging the Board with
an advisory duty must be taken only after long and thoughtful inves-
tigation.
Advice to Taxpayers
Apart from the above suggestion, an adjudicative agency pos-
sessing the expertise of the Tax Review Board could be granted the
additional power to render-where requested by specific taxpayers-
advisory opinions or declaratory judgments "" based on agreed or
153 Interview With Lennox L. Moak, in Philadelphia, Pa., Sept. 2, 1959.
i
54 An alternative would be ad hoc committees called together by the mayor or
the council. It would seem that a continuing body would have many advantages
over such an ad hoc system: it would eliminate the need for locating citizens pos-
sessing the required expertise and willing to serve; it would facilitate the speed with
which advice could be given; and it would have daily, first-hand contact with the
fiscal and tax problems of the city, so that it could initiate suggestions without specific
directives from mayor or council.
155 Apparently the Board does not now have such power, as it is empowered to
act only to review decisions of the department by which a taxpayer is aggrieved
and to approve refunds and compromises.
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hypothetical facts and posing contested issues of law.' These deci-
sions would have the same effect as a previous adjudication by the
Board, provided it could be proved that the actual facts fit the hypo-
thetical ones on which the decision is based. This could prove valu-
able, for example, to individuals or industries desiring to locate in
Philadelphia but unsure of their tax liability should they do so. These
decisions would be rendered under the same safeguards as are other
adjudications by the Board and would represent only a slight extension
of the Board's present function.
Judicial Review of Board Adjudications
As indicated throughout this Article, the Board's primary value
lies in the development of its power to adjudicate tax controversies.
The Board has developed its own procedures for making a record and
for deciding factual and legal issues-the common pleas courts can
add little to the adjudicatory process.'57 If review of board decisions
is taken solely on the basis of the record created before the Board,
the task of review can be performed equally well by an appellate court.
The dockets of the common pleas courts are already overcrowded; the
additional burden on these courts probably outweighs the small saving
resulting from discouraging frivolous appeals to appellate courts by the
interposition of additional hurdles for the taxpayer to surmount. And
the risk of nonuniform decisions is substantial where appeals are al-
lowed to seven separate common pleas courts composed of twenty-one
judges. It seems, therefore, that a more efficient procedure would
result if appeals from the Board went directly to a state appellate
court-most likely, the superior court.' 59
156 The law department will now render advance rulings to taxpayers where, in
the opinion of the department, such a ruling would not be inconsistent with sound
tax administration. These rulings bind the city. The department of collections will
give informal interpretive "advance opinions," but such opinions have no binding effect.
157 Their decision on review is based entirely on the record created before the
Board. See note 94 supra.
158 Even the three judges comprising a common pleas court do not always agree.
For example, in Manheim Laundry Co., Docket No. 40.02-A462, Formal Op. No. 57-9,
March 7, 1957, Supplemental Opinion, June 3, 1957, the Board refused to allocate
receipts, for purposes of computing the mercantile license tax, from routes outside
the city. On appeal, one judge of the common pleas court remanded, directing that
an allocation formula be adopted. Phila. Common Pleas No. 1, June Term 1957,
No. 3049. On remand, the Board complied but noted that in all other cases it would
adhere to its prior ruling. When returned to the common pleas court, the remaining
two judges, sitting en banc, affirmed without opinion this repudiation of its former
decision. When an opinion was necessitated by a further appeal to the supreme court,
the common pleas court en banc adopted the opinion of the Board as its own.
159 E.g., it is provided by statute that decisions of the state Public Utility Com-
mission are appealable directly to the superior court. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 66, § 1431
(Supp. 1960). This statutory authority removes PUC cases from the rule of Bell
Appeal, 396 Pa. 592, 152 A.2d 731 (1959).
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Composition, Tenure, and Qualifications of Board Members
If the Tax Review Board is to adjudicate factual and legal con-
troversies relating to municipal taxes and charges, then it is advisable
to select board members with a background in those and allied fields.
At least the majority of the members should be "learned in the law."' 60
This is not, however, to suggest that accountants have nothing to add.
In many instances, accountants may be better versed in factual prob-
lems, especially those involving accounting practice, than are attorneys.
Therefore, it seems wise to continue to have accountant members on
the Board; 101 they should be restricted, however, to minority mem-
bership and should at least be certified. 0 2
Since its inception the Board has been meeting only twice a week,
with a few additional meetings. Nevertheless, it has been able to dis-
pose of approximately 2,500 petitions each year after the initial year
of operations; 103 it suffers from little or no backlog or docket delay.
This workload has, however, been increasing annually, as taxpayers
and their representatives become more aware of the cheap, easy, efficient,
and fair method provided for contesting tax liability. Keeping the
Board's workload down is important because it would seem most de-
sirable that service on the Board be a well-compensated part-time posi-
tion. 6  Qualified men probably could not be attracted on a full-time
basis unless the salary offered were far higher than the city could
afford to pay. The Board has thus far attracted a number of public-
spirited and qualified men who could never have afforded to take the
post had it prevented them from carrying on their private practices.0 5
160 However, this qualification is not a constitutional requirement See Mer-
chants' Warehouse Co. v. Gelder, 349 Pa. 1, 36 A.2d 444 (1944). Magistrates and
justices of the peace need not be learned in the law. PA. CoNsT. art. V, §§ 11, 12.
Nor has such a qualification always been one for a common pleas judgeship. PA.
CoNsT. art. V, §§ 4, 5, 15.
161 The code, as amended, requires only that one of the Board's members be an
accountant and one an attorney. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANcES
§ 19-1701(1) (a) (1956).
162 The Board could also call on consultants from other fields in connection with
its nonadjudicatory roles. For example, economists and fiscal experts could make a
valuable contribution in determining the efficacy of new forms of taxation; business-
men could assess the effect of such forms of taxation and new tax policies and pro-
cedures; specialists in local government and administration might suggest new means
of safeguarding the public fisc.
16 See the annual reports of the Board from 1954 to 1958.
164 Under the code, as amended, each member of the Board receives $50.00 for
each meeting or hearing which he attends, but not more than $5,000 in any one year.
PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL ORD NANCES § 19-1701(8) (1956). Some
members attend more than 100 meetings a year; however, the meetings seldom take
a full day and the members have no expenses.
165 Since members are not prohibited from engaging in private practice, it would
seem wise to enact some conflict-of-interest law or regulation which would control
the contacts of members of the Board or their associates with the parties or matters
before the Board. While such a regulation might deter specialists from seeking
membership on the Board, it would probably not prevent the city from obtaining
the services of fully qualified men.
1961]
710 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [VoL09:670
Perhaps the salary should be re-evaluated; the current figure of fifty
dollars per meeting is not unreasonable, but it may be less than quali-
fied men could obtain as consultants. But equally important in at-
tracting qualified members is the opportunity for public service,
166 and
it is in maintaining this incentive that the part-time nature of the
Board's operations becomes important.
To insulate the Board from political pressures and to insure con-
tinued nonpolitical adjudications, a method of selection should be
adopted similar to the "Pennsylvania Plan," a technique currently being
urged as the best method for the selection of judges.'67 The present
six-year term should be lengthened to prevent political considerations
from influencing appointments. Presently terms are staggered,16 but
this does not effectively prevent a new mayor from "packing" the Board
inasmuch as he probably would have the right to appoint a completely
new membership.' 69 In practice, reappointments have been virtually
automatic, politics have not yet posed serious problems, and the ap-
pointees have been well qualified. To insure continuance of this
record, the tenure of board members should be similar to that of mem-
bers of the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
In the few years of its existence, the Tax Review Board has more
than justified the city's annual expenditures for its operations. It has
proved valuable to the citizen-taxpayer, the tax practitioner, and the
166 Mayors Clark and Dilworth have appointed well-qualified persons to the
Tax Review Board. The reform movement which they headed, however, may be
losing vitality. See REicHLY, THE ART OF GOVERNMENT 45-49 (1959). If this is so,
the problem of insulating the Board from political pressure and of attracting men
of high caliber and character may become acute.
167 Under this plan, a nonpartisan commission nominates a panel of qualified
persons; from the panel, the appointing power selects the appointee; after the ap-
pointee has served a short trial period, his name is submitted to the voters on a
separate ballot without party designation for approval or rejection. If approved,
the appointee serves for the remainder of his term and may run again, unopposed,
for another term. If the appointee is rejected, a new appointee is selected in the
same manner. See Harris, The Pennsylvania Plan, 62 DicK. L. REV. 217, 221 (1958).
168 The original tax review board ordinance provided for staggered terms, with
two members to be appointed for two years, two for four years, and tvo for six
years, with all subsequent appointments being for six years. Philadelphia, Pa., Tax
Review Board Ordinance § 1(b), Sept. 9, 1953, 1953 PHIIADELPHiA ORDINANCES
478. The code provides for six-year terms. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE OF GENERAL
ORDINANCES § 19-1701(1) (a) (1956).
169 "Except as expressly otherwise provided in this Charter, all appointed officers
and all members and all officers of boards and commissions shall serve at the pleasure
of the appointing power and until their successors are qualified." PHILADELPHIA
HOME RULE CHARTER § 3-404. The charter does not elsewhere provide specifically
for the terms of appointment of the Board; in fact, it provides for the replacement
of the original members when provided by council, § 3-914, but does not give council
the right to specify terms of office. If a mayor not in political agreement with his
predecessor were elected, the Board could become a political football. It is therefore
suggested that the charter be amended to eliminate the power of the mayor to remove
members of the Board during their terms, except for cause.
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city's fiscal operations by providing a forum for quick, efficient, and
fair disposition of citizen-sovereign tax disputes. The Board's value
as an adjudicatory agency and as an impartial dispenser of equitable
clemency has far outweighed the deficiencies in the performance of its
auditing function. While there are areas of needed improvement or
clarification relative to jurisdiction, structure, procedure, and roles,
these require legislative action and are not attributable to any inherent
failure on the part of the Board.
The Board today is held in high esteem by both courts and prac-
titioners. In my opinion, this results in large measure from the high
level of competence and impartiality set by the Board under its first
chairman and continued by his successors. The quality of the members
appointed to the Board has been generally high and, in carrying out
their duties, they have devoted energy far in excess of monetary com-
pensation received.
To insure the continued success of the Board, it is incumbent
upon the state legislature and the city council to insulate the Board
from political pressures to the greatest extent possible; to establish
adequate and clear standards for the Board's guidance; to clarify and
delimit its functions-in short, to apply the lessons learned in the first
few years of the Board's operations.
The field of municipal tax collection is not the only governmental
area in which there is a need for an administrative agency to adjudicate
disputes between government and citizen. Licensing, zoning, urban
planning, development and redevelopment, building restrictions, con-
demnations, and other forms of regulation of citizen activities give rise
to similar types of conflicts and to the consequent need for an agency
to resolve them. Nor is Philadelphia unique in facing these problems.
The experience of the Tax Review Board should serve as a working
model for other municipal agencies and other municipalities facing
similar problems arising from the growing complexities of modem
municipal government.
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